IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v63y2017i7p2197-2210.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Consistency as a Signal of Skills

Author

Listed:
  • Armin Falk

    (University of Bonn, 53113 Bonn, Germany)

  • Florian Zimmermann

    (University of Zurich, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland)

Abstract

This paper studies the role of consistency as a signaling device. We propose a two-period model that highlights the informativeness of consistency as a signal of skills and allows for the analysis of consequences for behavior. In a simple principal–agent experiment, we test the basic intuition of the model. We show that consistency is indeed associated with skills. Consequently, consistency is valued by others, inducing people to act consistently.

Suggested Citation

  • Armin Falk & Florian Zimmermann, 2017. "Consistency as a Signal of Skills," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(7), pages 2197-2210, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:63:y:2017:i:7:p:2197-2210
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2459
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2459
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2459?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Promises & Partnership," Research Papers in Economics 2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    2. Dan Ariely & Anat Bracha & Stephan Meier, 2009. "Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 544-555, March.
    3. Jean Tirole & Roland Bénabou, 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1652-1678, December.
    4. Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2004. "Promises, Threats and Fairness," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 397-420, April.
    5. Martin Brown & Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, 2004. "Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 747-780, May.
    6. Akerlof, George A & Dickens, William T, 1982. "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 307-319, June.
    7. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
    8. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2006. "Promises and Partnership," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1579-1601, November.
    9. Ebonya Washington & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2009. "Sticking with Your Vote: Cognitive Dissonance and Political Attitudes," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 86-111, January.
    10. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-877, October.
    11. Steven N. Kaplan & Mark M. Klebanov & Morten Sorensen, 2012. "Which CEO Characteristics and Abilities Matter?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(3), pages 973-1007, June.
    12. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    13. Mara Ewers & Florian Zimmermann, 2015. "Image And Misreporting," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 363-380, April.
    14. Armin Falk & Florian Zimmermann, 2013. "A Taste for Consistency and Survey Response Behavior," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 59(1), pages 181-193, March.
    15. Abeler, Johannes & Becker, Anke & Falk, Armin, 2014. "Representative evidence on lying costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 96-104.
    16. Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 1996. "Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1105-1134, December.
    17. Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2008. "Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 990-1008, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Elisa Cavatorta & David Schröder, 2019. "Measuring ambiguity preferences: A new ambiguity preference survey module," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 71-100, February.
    2. Yongping Bao & Ludwig Danwitz & Fabian Dvorak & Sebastian Fehrler & Lars Hornuf & Hsuan Yu Lin & Bettina von Helversen, 2022. "Similarity and Consistency in Algorithm-Guided Exploration," CESifo Working Paper Series 10188, CESifo.
    3. Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde & Hromek, Kristijan & Kleinknecht, Janina & Ludwig, Sandra, 2023. "How to counteract biased self-assessments? An experimental investigation of reactions to social information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 206(C), pages 1-25.
    4. Uyanga Turmunkh & Martijn J. van den Assem & Dennie van Dolder, 2019. "Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(10), pages 4795-4812, October.
    5. Gerhardt, Holger & Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah & Willrodt, Jana, 2017. "Does self-control depletion affect risk attitudes?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 463-487.
    6. Cécile Aubert & Huihui Ding, 2022. "Voter conformism and inefficient policies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 207-249, July.
    7. Tanja Artiga González & Francesco Capozza & Georg D. Granic, 2022. "Can Cognitive Dissonance Theory Explain Action Induced Changes in Political Preferences?," CESifo Working Paper Series 9549, CESifo.
    8. Tomoya Tajika, 2021. "Persistent and snap decision‐making," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 203-227, February.
    9. Fries, Tilman & Parra, Daniel, 2021. "Because I (don’t) deserve it: Entitlement and lying behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 495-512.
    10. Zachary Breig & Matthew Gibson & Jeffrey Shrader, 2019. "Why Do We Procrastinate? Present Bias and Optimism," Department of Economics Working Papers 2019-15, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    11. Fabian Dvorak & Urs Fischbacher & Katrin Schmelz, 2020. "Incentives for Conformity and Anticonformity," TWI Research Paper Series 122, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Armin Falk & Florian Zimmermann, 2011. "Preferences for Consistency," CESifo Working Paper Series 3528, CESifo.
    2. Behnk, Sascha & Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & García-Gallego, Aurora, 2014. "The role of ex post transparency in information transmission—An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 45-64.
    3. Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2019. "Preferences for Truth‐Telling," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(4), pages 1115-1153, July.
    4. Xiao, Erte, 2013. "Profit-seeking punishment corrupts norm obedience," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 321-344.
    5. Sanjit Dhami, 2017. "Human Ethics and Virtues: Rethinking the Homo-Economicus Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 6836, CESifo.
    6. Andreoni, James & Serra-Garcia, Marta, 2021. "Time inconsistent charitable giving," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    7. Alain Cohn & Tobias Gesche & Michel André Maréchal, 2022. "Honesty in the Digital Age," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 827-845, February.
    8. Andreas Lange & Claudia Schwirplies, 2021. "Bargaining With Charitable Promises: True Preferences and Strategic Behavior," CESifo Working Paper Series 9129, CESifo.
    9. Prasenjit Banerjee & Vegard Iversen & Sandip Mitra & Antonio Nicolò & Kunal Sen, 2018. "Politicians and Their Promises in an Uncertain World: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in India," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1806, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    10. Jeroen Ven & Marie Claire Villeval, 2015. "Dishonesty under scrutiny," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(1), pages 86-99, July.
    11. Kyota Eguchi, 2017. "Guilty Conscience And Incentives With Performance Assessment Errors," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 434-450, January.
    12. Dimant, Eugen, 2015. "On Peer Effects: Behavioral Contagion of (Un)Ethical Behavior and the Role of Social Identity," MPRA Paper 68732, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
    14. Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2019. "Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers hal-02176269, HAL.
    15. Zafar, Basit, 2011. "An experimental investigation of why individuals conform," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 774-798, August.
    16. Friesen, Lana & Gangadharan, Lata, 2013. "Designing self-reporting regimes to encourage truth telling: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 90-102.
    17. Simon Gaechter & Esther Kessler & Manfred Koenigstein, 2011. "The roles of incentives and voluntary cooperation for contractual compliance," Discussion Papers 2011-06, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    18. Anbarcı, Nejat & Feltovich, Nick & Gürdal, Mehmet Y., 2015. "Lying about the price? Ultimatum bargaining with messages and imperfectly observed offers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 346-360.
    19. Grossman, Zachary, 2010. "Self-Signaling Versus Social-Signaling in Giving," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt7320x2cp, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    20. Kiryl Khalmetski & Dirk Sliwka, 2019. "Disguising Lies—Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 79-110, November.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:63:y:2017:i:7:p:2197-2210. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.