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Click Fraud

Author

Listed:
  • Kenneth C. Wilbur

    (Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089)

  • Yi Zhu

    (Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089)

Abstract

Click fraud is the practice of deceptively clicking on search ads with the intention of either increasing third-party website revenues or exhausting an advertiser's budget. Search advertisers are forced to trust that search engines detect and prevent click fraud even though the engines get paid for every undetected fraudulent click. We find conditions under which it is in a search engine's interest to allow some click fraud. Under full information in a second-price auction, if % of clicks are fraudulent, advertisers will lower their bids by %, leaving the auction outcome and search engine revenues unchanged. However, if we allow for uncertainty in the amount of click fraud or change the auction type to include a click-through component, search engine revenues may rise or fall with click fraud. A decrease occurs when the keyword auction is relatively competitive because advertisers lower their budgets to hedge against downside risk. If the keyword auction is less competitive, click fraud may transfer surplus from the winning advertiser to the search engine. Our results suggest that the search advertising industry would benefit from using a neutral third party to audit search engines' click fraud detection algorithms.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth C. Wilbur & Yi Zhu, 2009. "Click Fraud," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(2), pages 293-308, 03-04.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:28:y:2009:i:2:p:293-308
    DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1080.0397
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Peitz, Martin & Reisinger, Markus, 2014. "The Economics of Internet Media," Working Papers 14-23, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    2. Yi Zhu & Kenneth C. Wilbur, 2011. "Hybrid Advertising Auctions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(2), pages 249-273, 03-04.
    3. Taylor, Greg, 2011. "The informativeness of on-line advertising," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 668-677.
    4. Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, 2007. "Search Engine Advertising: Pricing Ads to Context," Working Papers 07-23, NET Institute, revised Sep 2007.
    5. Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang & Juan Feng, 2011. "Cyclical Bid Adjustments in Search-Engine Advertising," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(9), pages 1703-1719, February.
    6. Bikram Ghosh & Axel Stock, 2010. "Advertising Effectiveness, Digital Video Recorders, and Product Market Competition," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(4), pages 639-649, 07-08.
    7. Yi Zhu & Kenneth C. Wilbur, 2008. "Strategic Bidding in Hybrid CPC/CPM Auctions," Working Papers 08-25, NET Institute, revised Oct 2008.
    8. Sha Yang & Anindya Ghose, 2010. "Analyzing the Relationship Between Organic and Sponsored Search Advertising: Positive, Negative, or Zero Interdependence?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(4), pages 602-623, 07-08.
    9. Youngwoo Koh, 2013. "Keyword auctions with budget-constrained bidders," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(4), pages 307-321, December.
    10. Yu (Jeffrey) Hu & Jiwoong Shin & Zhulei Tang, 2016. "Incentive Problems in Performance-Based Online Advertising Pricing: Cost per Click vs. Cost per Action," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(7), pages 2022-2038, July.

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