Search Engine Advertising: Pricing Ads to Context
AbstractEach search term put into a search engine produces a separate set of results. Correspondingly, each of the sets of ads displayed alongside these results is priced using a separate auction. Search engine advertising prices therefore reflect willingness to pay for context, unlike traditional ad prices that reflect willingness to pay for audience demographics. A growing policy debate asks if this marketing strategy merely makes advertising more informative, or whether it also effectively extracts rent from advertisers. To inform this debate and to better understand search engine advertising more generally, we examine advertising prices paid by lawyers for 174 Google search terms in 195 locations and exploit a natural experiment in “ambulance-chaser” regulations across states. Where contingency fee limits exist, the relative price of advertising is $2.27 lower. This suggests that context-based pricing allows prices to reflect heterogeneity in the profitability of customer leads. When lawyers cannot contact a client in writing, the relative price per ad click is $0.93 higher. This suggests that context-based pricing allows prices to reflect heterogeneity in advertisers’ other advertising options, even within a given local market. Thus, our results suggest that search engine advertising does give market power to the media platform; however, this market power is mitigated by substantial competition from offline marketing communications channels.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by NET Institute in its series Working Papers with number 07-23.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision: Sep 2007
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Web page: http://www.NETinst.org/
search engines; advertising; market power; advertising prices;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-11-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-11-10 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2007-11-10 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2007-11-10 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2007-11-10 (Marketing)
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- Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2010.
"Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs. Online Media,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1758R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2010.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Bonatti, Alessandro, 2010. "Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs. Online Media," CEPR Discussion Papers 7988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2010. "Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs. Online Media," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000284, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2010. "Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs. Online Media," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1758, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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