IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/orisre/v24y2013i3p787-801.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

IT Implementation Contract Design: Analytical and Experimental Investigation of IT Value, Learning, and Contract Structure

Author

Listed:
  • D. J. Wu

    (Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332)

  • Min Ding

    (Smeal College of Business, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802; and School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai, P. R. China, 200433)

  • Lorin M. Hitt

    (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104)

Abstract

This article analytically and experimentally investigates how firms can best capture the business value of information technology (IT) investments through IT contract design. Using a small sample of outsourcing contracts for enterprise information technology (EIT) projects in several industries—coupled with reviews of contracts used by a major enterprise software maker—the authors determine the common provisions and structural characteristics of EIT contracts. The authors use these characteristics to develop an analytical model of optimal contract design with principal–agent techniques. The model captures a set of key characteristics of EIT contracts, including a staged, multiperiod project structure; learning; probabilistic binary outcomes; variable fee structures; possibly risk-averse agents; and implementation risks. The model characterizes conditions under which multistage contracts enable clients to create and capture greater project value than single-stage projects, and how project staging enables firms to reduce project risks, capture learning benefits, and increase development effort. Finally, the authors use controlled laboratory experiments to complement their analytical approaches and demonstrate robustness of their key findings.

Suggested Citation

  • D. J. Wu & Min Ding & Lorin M. Hitt, 2013. "IT Implementation Contract Design: Analytical and Experimental Investigation of IT Value, Learning, and Contract Structure," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 24(3), pages 787-801, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:orisre:v:24:y:2013:i:3:p:787-801
    DOI: 10.1287/isre.1120.0448
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/isre.1120.0448
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/isre.1120.0448?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 2005. "Contract Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262025760, December.
    2. Radner, Roy, 1981. "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(5), pages 1127-1148, September.
    3. Christoph H. Loch & Stylianos Kavadias, 2002. "Dynamic Portfolio Selection of NPD Programs Using Marginal Returns," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(10), pages 1227-1241, October.
    4. Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004. "Field Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December.
    5. Vivek Choudhury & Rajiv Sabherwal, 2003. "Portfolios of Control in Outsourced Software Development Projects," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 291-314, September.
    6. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Macho, Ines & Rey, Patrick & Salanie, Bernard, 1994. "Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 1527-1553, October.
    7. Richard A. Lambert, 1983. "Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 441-452, Autumn.
    8. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1987. "Competition for Agency Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 296-307, Summer.
    9. Ferdinand K. Levy, 1965. "Adaptation in the Production Process," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 11(6), pages 136-154, April.
    10. Anderson, Edward G., 2001. "Managing the impact of high market growth and learning on knowledge worker productivity and service quality," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 134(3), pages 508-524, November.
    11. Umble, Elisabeth J. & Haft, Ronald R. & Umble, M. Michael, 2003. "Enterprise resource planning: Implementation procedures and critical success factors," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 241-257, April.
    12. Cheryl Gaimon & Gülru F. Özkan & Karen Napoleon, 2011. "Dynamic Resource Capabilities: Managing Workforce Knowledge with a Technology Upgrade," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(6), pages 1560-1578, December.
    13. Rajiv D. Banker & Gordon B. Davis & Sandra A. Slaughter, 1998. "Software Development Practices, Software Complexity, and Software Maintenance Performance: A Field Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 433-450, April.
    14. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    15. Radner, Roy, 1985. "Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1173-1198, September.
    16. Ramnath K. Chellappa & Nilesh Saraf, 2010. "Alliances, Rivalry, and Firm Performance in Enterprise Systems Software Markets: A Social Network Approach," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 21(4), pages 849-871, December.
    17. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    18. Cheryl Gaimon, 1997. "Planning Information Technology--Knowledge Worker Systems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(9), pages 1308-1328, September.
    19. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1986. "Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 326-338, Autumn.
    20. Seungjin Whang, 1992. "Contracting for Software Development," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(3), pages 307-324, March.
    21. Tom K. Lee & I.P.L. Png, 1990. "The Role of Installment Payments in Contracts for Services," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 83-99, Spring.
    22. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 69-76, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Krishnan S. Anand & Manu Goyal, 2019. "Ethics, Bounded Rationality, and IP Sharing in IT Outsourcing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(11), pages 5252-5267, November.
    2. Narayan Ramasubbu & Chris F. Kemerer, 2016. "Technical Debt and the Reliability of Enterprise Software Systems: A Competing Risks Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(5), pages 1487-1510, May.
    3. Maedeh Yassaee & Tobias Mettler, 2019. "Digital Occupational Health Systems: What Do Employees Think about it?," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 909-924, August.
    4. Marius F. Niculescu & D. J. Wu, 2014. "Economics of Free Under Perpetual Licensing: Implications for the Software Industry," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 25(1), pages 173-199, March.
    5. Sam Ruiqing Cao & Marco Iansiti, 2022. "Organizational Barriers to Transforming Large Finance Corporations: Cloud Adoption and the Importance of Technological Architecture," CESifo Working Paper Series 10142, CESifo.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. B. Caillaud & R. Guesnerie & P. Rey & J. Tirole, 1988. "Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    2. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
    3. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2021. "Agency theory meets matching theory," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 1-33, March.
    4. Dubois, Pierre, 2002. "Moral hazard, land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 35-64, June.
    5. Luis H. B. Braido, 2003. "Insurance and Incentives in Sharecropping," CESifo Working Paper Series 1098, CESifo.
    6. Luis H.B. Braido, 2005. "Risk and Insurance in Sharecropping," Risk and Insurance 0508002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    8. Nahum D. Melumad, 1989. "Asymmetric information and the termination of contracts in agencies," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(2), pages 733-753, March.
    9. Pierre Jinghong Liang, 2000. "Accounting Recognition, Moral Hazard, and Communication," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(3), pages 458-490, September.
    10. Cato, Susumu & Ebina, Takeshi, 2014. "Inequality aversion in long-term contracts," MPRA Paper 59893, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Fosco, C. & Mengel, F., 2008. "Incentives and informal networks," Research Memorandum 022, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    12. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1987. "Le risque moral dans la relation de mandat," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(1), pages 5-24.
    13. David E. M. Sappington, 1991. "Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 45-66, Spring.
    14. Rafael Tenorio, 2000. "The Economics of Professional Boxing Contracts," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 1(4), pages 363-384, November.
    15. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    16. Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 1000-1008.
    17. Lionel Artige & Rosella Nicolini, 2008. "Memory in Contracts: The experience of the EBRD (1991-2003)," CREPP Working Papers 0803, Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège.
    18. Dionne, Georges & Vanasse, Charles, 1997. "Une évaluation empirique de la nouvelle tarification de l’assurance automobile (1992) au Québec," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 73(1), pages 47-80, mars-juin.
    19. ,, 2015. "Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    20. George Georgiadis & Balazs Szentes, 2020. "Optimal Monitoring Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 2075-2107, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:orisre:v:24:y:2013:i:3:p:787-801. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.