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Asset Illiquidity and Dynamic Bank Capital Requirements

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  • Hajime Tomura

    (University of Tokyo)

Abstract

This paper introduces banks into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model by featuring asymmetric information as the underlying friction for banking. Asymmetric information about asset qualities causes a lemons problem in the asset market. In this environment, banks can issue liquid liabilities by pooling illiquid assets contaminated by asymmetric information. The liquidity transformation by banks results in a minimum value of common equity that banks must issue to avoid a run. This value increases with downside risk to the asset price and the expected degree of asset illiquidity. It rises during a boom if productivity shocks cause the business cycle.

Suggested Citation

  • Hajime Tomura, 2014. "Asset Illiquidity and Dynamic Bank Capital Requirements," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(3), pages 1-47, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2014:q:3:a:8
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Adriano A Rampini & S Viswanathan, 2019. "Financial Intermediary Capital," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(1), pages 413-455.
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    4. Francisco Covas & Shigeru Fujita, 2010. "Procyclicality of Capital Requirements in a General Equilibrium Model of Liquidity Dependence," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 6(34), pages 137-173, December.
    5. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2000. "A Theory of Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2431-2465, December.
    6. Kato, Ryo, 2006. "Liquidity, infinite horizons and macroeconomic fluctuations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(5), pages 1105-1130, July.
    7. Hajime Tomura, 2012. "Asset Illiquidity and Market Shutdowns in Competitive Equilibrium," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 15(3), pages 283-294, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ceccantoni, Giulia & Tarola, Ornella & Zanaj, Skerdilajda, 2018. "Green Consumption and Relative Preferences in a Vertically Differentiated International Oligopoly," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 129-139.
    2. Hollander, Hylton, 2017. "Macroprudential policy with convertible debt," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 54(PB), pages 285-305.
    3. Hajime Tomura, 2020. "A Model of Bank-Note Runs," Working Papers 1922, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    4. Hajime Tomura, 2019. "On Separation between Payment and Saving Instruments," Working Papers 1813, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    5. Chevallier, Claire Océane & El Joueidi, Sarah, 2019. "Capital regulation and banking bubbles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 117-129.
    6. Claire Océane Chevallier & Sarah El Joueidi, 2016. "Regulation and Rational Banking Bubbles in Infinite Horizon," DEM Discussion Paper Series 16-15, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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