How a Luxury Monopolist Might Benefit from a Stringent Counterfeit Monitoring Regime
AbstractMost studies in the intellectual property rights literature claim that the presence of counterfeit products hurts monopolists. This paper shows that this is not always true in a market with Veblen effects where a counterfeit monitoring regime is enforced. This paper finds an effect due to intellectual property rights enforcement that may be strong enough to produce a selling price that is higher than the price chosen without counterfeiting. Consequently, the monopolist may obtain greater profits in the presence of counterfeiting than in its absence.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan in its journal International Journal of Business and Economics.
Volume (Year): 4 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
intellectual property rights; counterfeiting; Veblen effects;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jen-Te Yao, 2005. "Counterfeiting and an Optimal Monitoring Policy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 95-114, January.
- Belk, Russell W, 1988. " Possessions and the Extended Self," Journal of Consumer Research, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 139-68, September.
- Bagwell, Laurie Simon & Bernheim, B Douglas, 1996. "Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 349-73, June.
- Matthew J. Baker & Brendan M. Cunningham, 2004.
"Court Decisions and Equity Markets: Estimating the Value of Copyright Protection,"
Departmental Working Papers
4, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
- Baker, Matthew J & Cunningham, Brendan M, 2006. "Court Decisions and Equity Markets: Estimating the Value of Copyright Protection," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(2), pages 567-96, October.
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