La colaboración empresarial desde la teoría de los derechos de propiedad
AbstractThis paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs agurments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimensions of going from "contracts" to "hierarchies" has been ignored in the past and with it the so called "costs of ownership". The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which Spanish firms participate, indicate that the cost of ownership may o set the benefits of hierarchial controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two. (Copyright: Fundación Empresa Pública)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Fundación SEPI in its journal Investigaciones Economicas.
Volume (Year): 26 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Investigaciones Economicas Fundación SEPI Quintana, 2 (planta 3) 28008 Madrid Spain
Web page: http://www.fundacionsepi.es/
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L63 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972.
"Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
- Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Balakrishnan, Srinivasan & Koza, Mitchell P., 1993. "Information asymmetry, adverse selection and joint-ventures : Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 99-117, January.
- Garcia-Canal, Esteban & Valdes-Llaneza, Ana & Sanchez-Lorda, Pablo, 2008. "Technological flows and choice of joint ventures in technology alliances," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 97-114, February.
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