An efficiency argument for affirmative action in higher education
AbstractWe consider a dynamic framework in which generations are linked by educational background. In particular, individuals differ in ability to benefit from education, parental education and appurtenance to a group (either a disadvantaged minority or a non-minority). The individual decision to undertake education is inefficient because people fail to account for the fact that their getting education increases the chances that their children will also gain access to education. This intergenerational externality is higher for people from the disadvantaged minority, provided that the difference in expected utility for children of uneducated and educated individuals is larger within this group. This provides an argument for affirmative action in higher education, in the form of larger subsidies to individuals from the minority group, which is exclusively based on efficiency considerations.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by IEF in its journal Hacienda Pública Española/Revista de Economía Pública.
Volume (Year): 187 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Affirmative action; intergenerational externality.;
Other versions of this item:
- Elena Del Rey & Maria Racionero, 2004. "An efficiency argument for affirmative action in higher education," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2005-447, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- De Fraja, Gianni, 2002. "Affirmative Action and Efficiency in Education," CEPR Discussion Papers 3357, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Elena Del Rey & MarÌa del Mar Racionero, 2002.
"Optimal educational choice and redistribution when parental education matters,"
Oxford Economic Papers,
Oxford University Press, vol. 54(3), pages 435-448, July.
- DEL REY, Elena & RACIONERO, Maria del Mar, . "Optimal educational choice and redistribution when parental education matters," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1582, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Harry Holzer & David Neumark, 1999.
"Assessing Affirmative Action,"
NBER Working Papers
7323, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roland G. Fryer Jr. & Glenn C. Loury, 2005.
"Affirmative Action and Its Mythology,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 147-162, Summer.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Olga Cantó Sánchez) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Olga Cantó Sánchez to update the entry or send us the correct address.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.