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Do Financial Linkages Ease the Credit Rationing of Forest Rights Mortgage Loans? Evidence from Farm Households in Fujian Province, China

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  • Li Li

    (College of Economics and Management, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350002, China
    Jinshan College, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350002, China)

  • Heliang Huang

    (College of Economics and Management, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350002, China)

  • Senwei Huang

    (College of Public Administration, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350002, China)

  • Siying Chen

    (College of Economics and Management, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350002, China)

Abstract

Affected by the small scale of forest farmers’ land and the imperfect development of the forest land transfer market, China’s forest rights mortgage loans have suffered from more serious credit rationing. The application of financial linkage theoretically has the effect of solving credit rationing. However, previous studies on financial linkages have focused on the field of credit lending, whereas the applied studies in the field of mortgage lending are mainly case studies on transaction models, and empirical tests on the application of financial linkages in mortgage lending are lacking. Therefore, to fill this gap, this study analyzed the effect of financial linkage on credit rationing for forestry mortgage loans and the mechanism of action through a study of farmers in Fujian, one of the key collective forestry areas in China, using the PSM method with 785 sample values. The results show the following: (1) Financial linkages have a significant mitigating effect on supply rationing, demand rationing, and the total rationing of forest rights mortgage loans. Compared to non-participation, financial linkages significantly reduced total rationing by 15.2%, with a 5% reduction in supply rationing and a 10.2% reduction in demand rationing. (2) The impact of financial linkage differs significantly among heterogeneous farmers. It has a significant mitigating effect on supply rationing for small-scale farmers, but not for large-scale farmers; meanwhile, it better mitigates demand rationing for large-scale farmers than for small-scale farmers. (3) In the mechanistic test, financial linkages were found to moderate the relationship between the value of collateral and supply rationing for small-scale farmers, and transaction costs play an intermediary role in the relationship between financial linkages and demand-based rationing. According to the study results, in order to promote the development of forest rights mortgage loans, it is necessary to develop different lending strategies for heterogeneous farmers, to further encourage small- and medium-sized farmers to participate in financial linkages, as well as to further reduce the related transaction costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Li Li & Heliang Huang & Senwei Huang & Siying Chen, 2023. "Do Financial Linkages Ease the Credit Rationing of Forest Rights Mortgage Loans? Evidence from Farm Households in Fujian Province, China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-22, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:4:p:3160-:d:1062896
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    References listed on IDEAS

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