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Combinatorial Auction of Used Cars Considering Pro-Environment Attribute: A Social Welfare Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Gang Ma

    (College of Economics and Management, Zhengzhou University of Light Industry, Zhengzhou 450001, China)

  • Zhengming Zhou

    (Postdoctoral Research Station, Bank of Communications, Shanghai 200336, China)

  • Shilei Wang

    (Bussiness School, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou 454000, China)

  • Ke Zhou

    (Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China)

  • Junjun Zheng

    (Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China)

  • Chujian Wang

    (College of Economics and Management, Zhengzhou University of Light Industry, Zhengzhou 450001, China)

Abstract

Air pollution is becoming more and more serious as the number of vehicles increases. To address such problems, many cities have implemented many measures, including the circular economy mode, in which used cars with low carbon emission are becoming important in the sustainable transportation and carbon abatement. Considering multi-attribute demand, this study designed combinatorial auction mechanism for the bidders of automobile enterprises on an online used-car platform to achieve social welfare maximization. Two kinds of attributes were considered, namely, price attribute and non-price attributes; the latter particularly included the pro-environment attribute based on an analysis of complementarity and substitutability. Moreover, the mechanism was proved to satisfy individual rational condition and incentive compatibility condition. Numerical application showed that preference for the pro-environment attribute can better realize social welfare and respond to national energy conservation and emission reduction targets. As a result, from the social welfare perspective, the multi-attribute combinatorial auction can provide a reference for more fair and effective allocation of used cars to bidders and can promote both buyer’s utility and seller’s income.

Suggested Citation

  • Gang Ma & Zhengming Zhou & Shilei Wang & Ke Zhou & Junjun Zheng & Chujian Wang, 2023. "Combinatorial Auction of Used Cars Considering Pro-Environment Attribute: A Social Welfare Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(16), pages 1-16, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:16:p:12512-:d:1219381
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    References listed on IDEAS

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