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An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Relationship between Core Stakeholders of Forest Governance

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  • Huiyong Xu

    (College of Economics and Management, Beijing Forestry University, Beijing 100083, China)

  • Xuejiao Zhao

    (Research Center for Green Development of Great Wall Cultural Economic Belt, School of Tourism, Collaborative Innovation Center for Urban-Rural Integration Development, New Rural Development Center, Hebei University of Economics and Business, Shijiazhuang 050061, China)

  • Dahong Zhang

    (College of Economics and Management, Beijing Forestry University, Beijing 100083, China)

Abstract

The interest relationship among forest governance stakeholders will change with the influence of political, economic, cultural, and other factors. Studying the logical relationship between various stakeholders in the process of forest management is an important measure to adhere to the “clear water and green mountains are gold hills and silver mountains” and implement the concept of green development under the new form. In this paper, the evolutionary game method is used to build a dynamic evolutionary game model, analyze the evolutionary stability strategy and replicator dynamics of the three core stakeholders of government, enterprises, and rural community residents, and calculate the equilibrium stability point. The behavioral strategy selection and evolutionary stability conditions of each game player are analyzed. The results show that the “guidance” of the government is a strong guarantee for the realization of the tripartite equilibrium. The government is in a very active and strong position and needs the guidance of the government to achieve stability. The results show that the “guidance” of the government is a strong guarantee for the realization of the tripartite equilibrium. The government is in a very active and strong position and needs the guidance of the government to achieve stability. Therefore, the government should actively encourage rural community residents to participate in forest management, strengthen the supervision of forestry enterprises, and achieve effective management of forest resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Huiyong Xu & Xuejiao Zhao & Dahong Zhang, 2023. "An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Relationship between Core Stakeholders of Forest Governance," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(13), pages 1-14, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:13:p:10546-:d:1186896
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    References listed on IDEAS

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