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Temporal and Spatial Variations in China’s Government-Official-Appointment System and Local Water-Environment Pollution

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  • Xingheng Xie

    (School of Business, Ningbo University, Ningbo 315211, China
    School of Economics and Management, Ningbo University of Technology, Ningbo 315211, China)

  • Mengting Zhang

    (School of Business, Ningbo University, Ningbo 315211, China)

  • Changbiao Zhong

    (School of Business, Ningbo University, Ningbo 315211, China)

Abstract

Environmental governance is one of the priority tasks that is faced by China in its drive for sustainable social development. Environmental protection necessitates an equal focus on pollution-source control and pollution governance, and it shall be safeguarded with sound local economic-development models and long-term environmental-protection mechanisms. In this study, we investigated the government-official-appointment system and the effects of the personal characteristics of government officials and economic variables on the local water-environment pollution, measured by industrial wastewater discharge, using a dataset of Communist Party of China (CPC) municipal committee secretaries and municipal governors covering the period 2003–2012. We found that some temporal and spatial factors of China’s personnel-management system for government officials are correlated to the environment. More specifically, the turnover and interjurisdictional transfer of municipal governors contribute to long-term environmental protection, longer tenures facilitate better environmental protection, municipal governors who serve in their native provinces but not in their native municipalities facilitate better local environment protection, and officials may take different approaches towards environmental maintenance and governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Xingheng Xie & Mengting Zhang & Changbiao Zhong, 2022. "Temporal and Spatial Variations in China’s Government-Official-Appointment System and Local Water-Environment Pollution," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(14), pages 1-17, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:14:y:2022:i:14:p:8868-:d:867005
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