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The Incentive Role of Creating "Cities" in China

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Author Info
Li, Lixing

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Abstract

This paper examines a distinctive mechanism of providing incentives to local governments – upgrading counties to "cities". In China, awarding city status to existing counties is the dominant way of creating new urban administrative units, during which the local government gets many benefits. Using a large panel data set covering all counties in China during 1993-2004, I investigate the determinants of upgrading. I find that the official minimum requirements for upgrading are not enforced in practice. Instead, economic growth rate plays a key role in obtaining city status. An empirical test is then conducted to distinguish between a principal-agent incentive mechanism and political bargaining. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the central government uses upgrading to reward local officials for high growth, as well as aligning local interests with those of the center. This paper highlights the importance of both fiscal and political incentives facing the local government. The comparison between incentive mechanism and bargaining sheds light on an important question about China’s politics of governance: where does power lie in China?

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8594.

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Date of creation: Apr 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8594

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Related research
Keywords: economic growth; incentive mechanism; bargaining; political centralization; fiscal decentralization; county-to-city upgrading; central-local relationship;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
R11 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Analysis of Growth, Development, and Changes
P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy

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References listed on IDEAS
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    Other versions:
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    Other versions:
  8. Richard Bird & Christine C.P.Wong, 2005. "China's Fiscal System: A Work in Progress," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0520, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
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    Other versions:
  14. Tsui, Kai-yuen, 2005. "Local tax system, intergovernmental transfers and China's local fiscal disparities," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 173-196, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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