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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Digital Financial Enterprises and Regulators Based on Delayed Replication Dynamic Equation

Author

Listed:
  • Mengzhu Xu

    (School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China)

  • Zixin Liu

    (School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China
    Guizhou Key Laboratory of Big Data Statistical Analysis, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China)

  • Changjin Xu

    (Guizhou Key Laboratory of Economics System Simulation, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China)

  • Nengfa Wang

    (School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China)

Abstract

With the frequent occurrence of financial risks, financial innovation supervision has become an important research issue, and excellent regulatory strategies are of great significance to maintain the stability and sustainable development of financial markets. Thus, this paper intends to analyze the financial regulation strategies through evolutionary game theory. In this paper, the delayed replication dynamic equation and the non-delayed replication dynamic equation are established, respectively, under different reward and punishment mechanisms, and their stability conditions and evolutionary stability strategies are investigated. The analysis finds that under the static mechanism, the internal equilibrium is unstable, and the delay does not affect the stability of the system, while in the dynamic mechanism, when the delay is less than a critical value, the two sides of the game have an evolutionary stable strategy, otherwise it is unstable, and Hopf bifurcation occurs at threshold. Finally, some numerical simulation examples are provided, and the numerical results show the correctness of the proposed algorithm.

Suggested Citation

  • Mengzhu Xu & Zixin Liu & Changjin Xu & Nengfa Wang, 2024. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Digital Financial Enterprises and Regulators Based on Delayed Replication Dynamic Equation," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-18, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:12:y:2024:i:3:p:385-:d:1325934
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hao Fu & Yue Liu & Pengfei Cheng & Sijie Cheng, 2022. "Evolutionary Game Analysis on Innovation Behavior of Digital Financial Enterprises under the Dynamic Reward and Punishment Mechanism of Government," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(19), pages 1-18, October.
    2. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    3. Samuel G. Hanson & Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 2011. "A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
    4. Hu, Limi & Qiu, Xiaoling, 2022. "Stability analysis of game models with fixed and stochastic delays," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 435(C).
    5. Zhou, Xi & Chen, Shou, 2021. "FinTech innovation regulation based on reputation theory with the participation of new media," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
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