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On the Rising Complexity of Bank Regulatory Capital Requirements: From Global Guidelines to their United States (US) Implementation

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  • James R. Barth

    (Lowder Eminent Scholar in Finance, Auburn University, Auburn, AL 36849, USA)

  • Stephen Matteo Miller

    (Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA)

Abstract

After the Latin American Debt Crisis of 1982, the official response worldwide turned to minimum capital standards to promote stable banking systems. Despite their existence, however, such standards have still not prevented periodic disruptions in the banking sectors of various countries. After the 2007–2009 crisis, bank capital requirements have, in some cases, increased and overall have become even more complex. This paper reviews (1) how Basel-style capital adequacy guidelines have evolved, becoming higher in some cases and overall more complex, (2) how the United States (US) implementation of these guidelines has contributed to regulatory complexity, even when omitting other bank capital regulations that are specific to the US, and (3) how the US regulatory measures still do not provide equally valuable information about whether a bank is adequately capitalized.

Suggested Citation

  • James R. Barth & Stephen Matteo Miller, 2018. "On the Rising Complexity of Bank Regulatory Capital Requirements: From Global Guidelines to their United States (US) Implementation," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-33, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jjrfmx:v:11:y:2018:i:4:p:77-:d:179994
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Zweifel, 2021. "Solvency Regulation—An Assessment of Basel III for Banks and of Planned Solvency III for Insurers," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(6), pages 1-22, June.
    2. Thomas L. Hogan, 2021. "A Review of the Regulatory Impact Analysis of Risk-Based Capital and Related Liquidity Rules," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-29, January.
    3. James R. Barth, 2019. "Regulatory Responses by Countries to Banking/Financial Crises," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-6, December.
    4. Baik, Hyeoncheol & Han, Sumin & Joo, Sunghoon & Lee, Kangbok, 2022. "A bank's optimal capital ratio: A time-varying parameter model to the partial adjustment framework," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    5. Miller, Steph & Hoarty, Blake, 2020. "On Regulation and Excess Reserves: The Case of Basel III," Working Papers 10243, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    6. Chenzi Yang & Fernando Moreira & Thomas Welsh Archibald, 2023. "Community banks' capital requirements and regional housing tenure," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 723-746, December.
    7. Michael McAleer, 2020. "Review Papers for Journal of Risk and Financial Management ( JRFM )," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(8), pages 1-4, August.
    8. James R. Barth & Sunghoon Joo & Kang‐Bok Lee, 2022. "Bank–client cross‐ownership of bank stocks: A network analysis," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 280-312, June.
    9. Stephen Matteo Miller & Blake Hoarty, 2021. "On regulation and excess reserves: The case of Basel III," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 44(2), pages 215-247, June.

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