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The recourse rule, regulatory arbitrage, and the financial crisis

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  • Stephen Matteo Miller

    (George Mason University)

Abstract

In November 2001, regulators finalized the “Recourse Rule.” The rule lowered risk weights, and therefore commercial bank holding company capital requirements, to 0.2 for holdings of AAA- and AA-rated “private label” securitization tranches, created by investment banks and securitizing commercial bank holding company subsidiaries; risk weights for A-rated holdings equaled 0.5. The rule’s aim was to encourage securitization, but not risk-taking. Regulators indicated that the rule would apply to larger holding companies, without identifying them. Using bank holding companies with subsidiaries that commented on the proposed rule-makings as a treatment variable, average treatment effects from a fully flexible difference-in-differences model indicate that treated banks increased their holdings of the highly rated tranches relative to total assets, while other holding companies, on average, did not. Holding companies with greater highly rated tranche holdings also experienced greater increases in risk after Q1 2008, which suggests that poor performance may have been unanticipated.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Matteo Miller, 2018. "The recourse rule, regulatory arbitrage, and the financial crisis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 195-217, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:54:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11149-018-9364-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-018-9364-z
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas L. Hogan, 2021. "A Review of the Regulatory Impact Analysis of Risk-Based Capital and Related Liquidity Rules," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-29, January.
    2. Lynn M. Fisher & Mike Fratantoni & Stephen D. Oliner & Tobias J. Peter, 2021. "Jumbo rates below conforming rates: When did this happen and why?," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(S2), pages 461-489, September.
    3. Stephen Matteo Miller & Blake Hoarty, 2021. "On regulation and excess reserves: The case of Basel III," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 44(2), pages 215-247, June.
    4. Miller, Steph & Hoarty, Blake, 2020. "On Regulation and Excess Reserves: The Case of Basel III," Working Papers 10243, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    5. James R. Barth & Stephen Matteo Miller, 2018. "On the Rising Complexity of Bank Regulatory Capital Requirements: From Global Guidelines to their United States (US) Implementation," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-33, November.
    6. Giebel, Marek & Kraft, Kornelius, 2020. "R&D investment under financing constraints," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-018, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Difference-in-differences; Financial crisis; Regulatory capital requirements; Securitization; Unintended consequences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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