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Liability Determination of School Sports Injury Accidents: An Analysis Framework Based on Evolutionary Game

Author

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  • Qing Lan

    (School of Public Administration, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
    College of Physical Education, Yichun University, Yichun 336000, China)

  • Xiaojun Li

    (College of Physical Education, Yichun University, Yichun 336000, China)

Abstract

In recent years, the outbreak of many school sports injury accidents aroused widespread public concern about liability determination of accident. Previous studies have examined the legal application of the liability principles from a law perspective, but few kinds of research attempted to analyze the progress of liability determination from the perspective of “law economics”. To fill this research gap, we introduce the evolutionary game model, as an important theoretical tool of “law economics”, to investigate how various factors influence the strategy selection of the parties, as well as examine what liability principle can effectively treat school sports injury accidents. The results indicate that the strategic selection of the subject of liability is significantly related to the accident compensation cost and the prevention cost of both parties. Moreover, we also find that both strict and proportional liability rules can play key roles in dealing with the issue of liability determination of school sports injury accidents, but the two liability rules have different effects on the strategic selection of parties. More specifically, compared to the strict liability principle, the proportional liability principle can motivate both the school and the students to adopt the active strategy of “appropriate caution” to prevent occurring sports injury accidents in schools.

Suggested Citation

  • Qing Lan & Xiaojun Li, 2019. "Liability Determination of School Sports Injury Accidents: An Analysis Framework Based on Evolutionary Game," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(18), pages 1-19, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:16:y:2019:i:18:p:3403-:d:267050
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Smith, Adam, 1977. "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226763743 edited by Cannan, Edwin, September.
    2. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    3. Hamid Mohtadi, 2017. "Risk‐Mitigating Policies and Adversarial Behavior: Case of Backlash," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(3), pages 459-470, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Weiwei Liu & Jianing Yang & Kexin Bi, 2020. "Factors Influencing Private Hospitals’ Participation in the Innovation of Biomedical Engineering Industry: A Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(20), pages 1-18, October.

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