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Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games

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  • Paulo Barelli

    () (Department of Economics, University of Rochester, 214 Harkness Hall, Rochester, NY 14627, USA, Insper Institute of Education and Research, Rua Quatá, 300 - Vila Olímpia 04546-042, São Paulo, Brazil)

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    Abstract

    We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by MDPI, Open Access Journal in its journal Games.

    Volume (Year): 1 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 4 (October)
    Pages: 415-421

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    Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:4:p:415-421:d:9917

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    Related research

    Keywords: hierarchies of conditional beliefs; epistemic conditions; common belief; correlated subgame perfect equilibrium;

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    1. Barelli, Paulo, 2009. "Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 363-375, November.
    2. Pierpaolo Battigalli, . "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 111, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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