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Multicell Interference Management in Device to Device Underlay Cellular Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Georgios Katsinis

    (School of Electrical & Computer Engineering, National Technical University of Athens, 9 Iroon Polytechniou str, Zografou, 15780 Athens, Greece)

  • Eirini Eleni Tsiropoulou

    (Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131, USA)

  • Symeon Papavassiliou

    (School of Electrical & Computer Engineering, National Technical University of Athens, 9 Iroon Polytechniou str, Zografou, 15780 Athens, Greece)

Abstract

In this paper, the problem of interference mitigation in a multicell Device to Device (D2D) underlay cellular network is addressed. In this type of network architectures, cellular users and D2D users share common Resource Blocks (RBs). Though such paradigms allow potential increase in the number of supported users, the latter comes at the cost of interference increase that in turn calls for the design of efficient interference mitigation methodologies. To treat this problem efficiently, we propose a two step approach, where the first step concerns the efficient RB allocation to the users and the second one the transmission power allocation. Specifically, the RB allocation problem is formulated as a bilateral symmetric interaction game. This assures the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) point of the game, while a distributed algorithm, which converges to it, is devised. The power allocation problem is formulated as a linear programming problem per RB, and the equivalency between this problem and the total power minimization problem is shown. Finally, the operational effectiveness of the proposed approach is evaluated via numerical simulations, while its superiority against state of the art approaches existing in the recent literature is shown in terms of increased number of supported users, interference reduction and power minimization.

Suggested Citation

  • Georgios Katsinis & Eirini Eleni Tsiropoulou & Symeon Papavassiliou, 2017. "Multicell Interference Management in Device to Device Underlay Cellular Networks," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-20, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jftint:v:9:y:2017:i:3:p:44-:d:107332
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ui, Takashi, 2000. "A Shapley Value Representation of Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 121-135, April.
    2. Xinhua Wang & Yan Yang & Jinlu Sheng, 2017. "Energy Efficient Power Allocation for the Uplink of Distributed Massive MIMO Systems," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-11, June.
    3. Leonardo Militano & Antonino Orsino & Giuseppe Araniti & Antonio Iera, 2017. "NB-IoT for D2D-Enhanced Content Uploading with Social Trustworthiness in 5G Systems †," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-14, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Djorwé Témoa & Anna Förster & Kolyang & Serge Doka Yamigno, 2019. "A Reinforcement Learning Based Intercell Interference Coordination in LTE Networks," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-23, January.
    2. Boon-Chong Seet & Syed Faraz Hasan & Peter Han-Joo Chong, 2018. "Recent Advances on Cellular D2D Communications," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 10(1), pages 1-3, January.

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