Regulatory Deterrence and Registered Insider Trading: The Case of Tender Offers
AbstractEmpirical studies of insider trading regulation suggest that regulators have been ineffective in deterring illegal insider trading in the 1960s and 1970s. This paper investigates the impact of the passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), which dramatically increased the potential penalties associated with insider trading. We examine both the incidence and the profitability of the transactions of registered insiders in firms which were the targets of tender offers. Our results indicate that the adoption of more stringent regulations and more active enforcement reduced both the volume and the profitability of trading by registered insiders of target firms in the weeks preceding tender offers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Financial Management Association in its journal Financial Management.
Volume (Year): 20 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
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- Denis, David J. & Xu, Jin, 2013. "Insider trading restrictions and top executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 91-112.
- Podolski, Edward J. & Truong, Cameron & Veeraraghavan, Madhu, 2013. "Informed options trading prior to takeovers – Does the regulatory environment matter?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 286-305.
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