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Why commercial banks sell loans: an empirical analysis

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  • Christine A. Pavel
  • David Phillis

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  • Christine A. Pavel & David Phillis, 1987. "Why commercial banks sell loans: an empirical analysis," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 11(May), pages 3-14.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhep:y:1987:i:may:p:3-14:n:v.11no.3
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    File URL: http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/economic_perspectives/1987/ep_may_jun1987_part1_pavel.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Amemiya, Takeshi, 1973. "Regression Analysis when the Dependent Variable is Truncated Normal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 997-1016, November.
    2. Herbert L. Baer & Elijah Brewer, 1986. "Uninsured deposits as a source of market discipline: some new evidence," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 10(Sep), pages 23-31.
    3. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    4. John P. Judd, 1979. "Competition between the commercial paper market and commercial banks," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Win, pages 39-53.
    5. Buser, Stephen A & Chen, Andrew H & Kane, Edward J, 1981. "Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(1), pages 51-60, March.
    6. Ian Giddy, 1985. "Regulation of off-balance sheet banking," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue June, pages 165-190.
    7. Hannan, Timothy H & Hanweck, Gerald A, 1988. "Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large Certificates of Deposit," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(2), pages 203-211, May.
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    Keywords

    Bank loans; Bank assets;

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