Two-Stage Quantity-Setting Games and Tacit Collusion
AbstractThis paper considers a two-stage quantity-setting duopoly model. The paper classifies demand functions into the following four cases in terms of the goods relevance and strategic relevance between both firms: ‘substitute goods and strategic substitutes’, ‘substitute goods and strategic complements’, ‘complementary goods and strategic complements’ and ‘complementary goods and strategic substitutes’. The paper correlates each case with two opposite strategic commitments. The paper examines the possibility of tacit collusion in each of four cases.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Finnish Economic Association in its journal Finnish Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 24 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 1998.
"Collusion and Price Rigidity,"
98-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 2004. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(2), pages 317-349, 04.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 2004. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 317-349.
- Luca Colombo & Paola Labrecciosa, 2007. "Sustaining Collusion under Economic Integration," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 905-915, November.
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