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Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence. Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean

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Author Info
Eva Gutiérrez () (Monetary Exchange and Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund)
Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between the constitutional entrenchment of central bank independence and inflation performance. Empirical studies for developing countries have not found a relationship between central bank independence, proxied by the de jure independence established in the central bank law, and inflation. We argue that the Constitution is likely to be better enforced than ordinary statutes owing to its higher legal rank. Our empirical analysis finds that in a sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries, those countries that entrench the independence of the central bank in the Constitution have a better inflation performance.

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File URL: http://www.economiamexicana.cide.edu/num_anteriores/XIII-2/EVA_GUTIERREZ.pdf
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Article provided by in its journal Economia Mexicana NUEVA EPOCA.

Volume (Year): XIII (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (July-December)
Pages: 255-287
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Handle: RePEc:emc:ecomex:v:13:y:2004:i:2:p:255-287

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Related research
Keywords: central bank independence; inflation; Latin American countries.;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B, 1995. "Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 397-423, September.
    Other versions:
  2. Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, 1997. "Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 381-99, August.
    Other versions:
  3. Marta Campillo & Jeffrey A. Miron, 1996. "Why Does Inflation Differ Across Countries?," NBER Working Papers 5540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Andersen, Torben M. & Schneider, Friedrich, 1986. "Coordination of fiscal and monetary policy under different institutional arrangements," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 169-191. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Berger, Helge & Haan, Jakob de & Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
  7. Haan, Jakob de & Kooi, Willem J., 2000. "Does central bank independence really matter?: New evidence for developing countries using a new indicator," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 643-664, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
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  9. Cukierman, Alex & Miller, Geoffrey & Neyapti, Bilin, 2001. "Central Bank Reform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies - An International Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 2808, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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