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Are More Democratic Donor Countries More Development Oriented? Domestic Institutions and External Development Promotion in OECD Countries

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  • Faust, Jörg
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    Abstract

    Summary This paper reveals how political institutions within OECD countries affect those countries' foreign policies toward the developing world. For identifying the overall development orientation, the paper uses the Commitment to Development Index, which aggregates different foreign policy fields such as development assistance, trade, investment, and environmental policies according to their development orientation in poor countries. The result of regressions analysis demonstrates that the varying quality of democratic voice and accountability in 21 OECD countries explains a large part of the differences with regard to the Commitment to Development Index.These findings suggest that the existence of democratic and transparent political institutions is not only important in developing countries because they orient politicians toward the encompassing interests of society. A similar logic applies for rich countries' policies toward poor countries.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal World Development.

    Volume (Year): 36 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 3 (March)
    Pages: 383-398

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:383-398

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

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    Cited by:
    1. Jonathan Pickering & Jakob Skovgaard & Soyeun Kim & J. Timmons Roberts & David Rossati & Martin Stadelmann & Hendrikje Reich, 2013. "Acting on Climate Finance Pledges: Inter-Agency Dynamics and Relationships with Aid in Contributor States," CCEP Working Papers 1306, Centre for Climate Economics & Policy, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.

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