IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/trapol/v114y2021icp127-137.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A game theoretic approach on improving sulphur compliance

Author

Listed:
  • Zis, Thalis P.V.

Abstract

The global sulphur cap is the final step in a series of regulations that aim to reduce SOx emissions from shipping. It affects international shipping and requires all vessels to use fuel with a maximum of 0.5% sulphur content or use abatement technologies that achieve a similar reduction in SOx emissions. The existing legislative framework poses several challenges, stemming mainly from a highly non-homogeneous and spatially differentiated system, with cases where the penalty fines are as low as the benefit that the violator enjoyed from non-compliances. The purpose of this paper is to develop a game theoretic modelling framework that improves the effectiveness of sulphur regulations enforcement and proposes a uniform violation fine system. A mixed strategy game with two players is formulated, representing the ship operator (who can either comply or not with the regulation), and an enforcement agency (that can opt to inspect or not inspect the ship) respectively. The proposed model can improve compliance rates and increase societal environmental benefits through reduced sulphur emissions. We also consider a new system with warnings issued for repeated violations of the regulation that would lead to a mandatory retrofit of the vessel with sulphur abatement technologies. Such models can ensure a level playing field for ship operators that currently have invested heavily in abatement options to comply with the sulphur regulations.

Suggested Citation

  • Zis, Thalis P.V., 2021. "A game theoretic approach on improving sulphur compliance," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 127-137.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:trapol:v:114:y:2021:i:c:p:127-137
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2021.09.012
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967070X21002778
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.tranpol.2021.09.012?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Itf, 2016. "Reducing Sulphur Emissions from Ships: The Impact of International Regulation," International Transport Forum Policy Papers 18, OECD Publishing.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Martijn Brons & Panayotis Christidis, 2012. "External cost calculator for Marco Polo freight transport project proposals call 2012 version," JRC Research Reports JRC72879, Joint Research Centre.
    4. Harilaos N. Psaraftis & Christos A. Kontovas, 2020. "Influence and transparency at the IMO: the name of the game," Maritime Economics & Logistics, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association of Maritime Economists (IAME), vol. 22(2), pages 151-172, June.
    5. Zavitsas, Konstantinos & Zis, Thalis & Bell, Michael G.H., 2018. "The impact of flexible environmental policy on maritime supply chain resilience," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 116-128.
    6. Barabino, Benedetto & Salis, Sara & Useli, Bruno, 2014. "Fare evasion in proof-of-payment transit systems: Deriving the optimum inspection level," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 1-17.
    7. Miluše Tichavska & Beatriz Tovar, 2017. "External costs from vessel emissions at port: a review of the methodological and empirical state of the art," Transport Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(3), pages 383-402, May.
    8. Troncoso, Rodrigo & de Grange, Louis, 2017. "Fare evasion in public transport: A time series approach," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 311-318.
    9. Bell, Michael G. H., 2000. "A game theory approach to measuring the performance reliability of transport networks," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 533-545, August.
    10. Sasaki, Yasuo, 2014. "Optimal choices of fare collection systems for public transportations: Barrier versus barrier-free," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 107-114.
    11. Yang, Zhisen & Yang, Zaili & Yin, Jingbo & Qu, Zhuohua, 2018. "A risk-based game model for rational inspections in port state control," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 477-495.
    12. Xia, Jun & Wang, Kai & Wang, Shuaian, 2019. "Drone scheduling to monitor vessels in emission control areas," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 174-196.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Boyd, Colin, 2020. "Revisiting the foundations of fare evasion research," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 313-324.
    2. Ramos, Raúl & Silva, Hugo E., 2023. "Fare evasion in public transport: How does it affect the optimal design and pricing?," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
    3. Felipe González & Carolina Busco & Katheryn Codocedo, 2019. "Fare Evasion in Public Transport: Grouping Transantiago Users’ Behavior," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(23), pages 1-17, November.
    4. Elmar Wilhelm M. Fürst & David M. Herold, 2018. "Fare Evasion and Ticket Forgery in Public Transport: Insights from Germany, Austria and Switzerland," Societies, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-16, October.
    5. Guzman, Luis A. & Arellana, Julian & Camargo, José Pablo, 2021. "A hybrid discrete choice model to understand the effect of public policy on fare evasion discouragement in Bogotá's Bus Rapid Transit," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 140-153.
    6. Benedetto Barabino & Cristian Lai & Alessandro Olivo, 2020. "Fare evasion in public transport systems: a review of the literature," Public Transport, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 27-88, March.
    7. Barabino, Benedetto & Salis, Sara & Useli, Bruno, 2015. "What are the determinants in making people free riders in proof-of-payment transit systems? Evidence from Italy," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 184-196.
    8. Nourinejad, Mehdi & Gandomi, Amir & Roorda, Matthew J., 2020. "Illegal parking and optimal enforcement policies with search friction," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    9. Munizaga, Marcela A. & Gschwender, Antonio & Gallegos, Nestor, 2020. "Fare evasion correction for smartcard-based origin-destination matrices," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 307-322.
    10. Delbosc, Alexa & Currie, Graham, 2016. "Cluster analysis of fare evasion behaviours in Melbourne, Australia," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 29-36.
    11. Porath, Keiko & Galilea, Patricia, 2020. "Temporal analysis of fare evasion in Transantiago: A socio-political view," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    12. Oscar Egu & Patrick Bonnel, 2020. "Can we estimate accurately fare evasion without a survey? Results from a data comparison approach in Lyon using fare collection data, fare inspection data and counting data," Public Transport, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 1-26, March.
    13. Benedetto Barabino & Sara Salis, 2019. "Moving Towards a More Accurate Level of Inspection Against Fare Evasion in Proof-of-Payment Transit Systems," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 1319-1346, December.
    14. Brotcorne, L. & Escalona, P. & Fortz, B. & Labbé, M., 2021. "Fare inspection patrols scheduling in transit systems using a Stackelberg game approach," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 1-20.
    15. Yang, Zhisen & Yang, Zaili & Yin, Jingbo & Qu, Zhuohua, 2018. "A risk-based game model for rational inspections in port state control," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 477-495.
    16. Benedetto Barabino & Sara Salis, 2023. "Segmenting fare-evaders by tandem clustering and logistic regression models," Public Transport, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 61-96, March.
    17. Dennis L. Gärtner, 2022. "Corporate Leniency in a Dynamic World: The Preemptive Push of an Uncertain Future," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 119-146, March.
    18. Deborah A. Cobb-Clark & Chris Ryan & Ana Sartbayeva, 2009. "Taking Chances: The Effect of Growing Up on Welfare on the Risky Behaviour of Young People," CEPR Discussion Papers 604, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    19. J. K. Pappalardo, 2022. "Economics of Consumer Protection: Contributions and Challenges in Estimating Consumer Injury and Evaluating Consumer Protection Policy," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 201-238, June.
    20. M. Martin Boyer, 2007. "Resistance (to Fraud) Is Futile," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(2), pages 461-492, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:trapol:v:114:y:2021:i:c:p:127-137. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/30473/description#description .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.