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Spectrum auctions in a thin market: The Korean case

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  • Choi, Yong-Jae

Abstract

In 2010, the Korean government adopted spectrum auctions and introduced a market mechanism into spectrum management. However, the government has often been confronted with conflicts between diverse policy goals of spectrum auctions. A thin spectrum market, where only three incumbent MNOs bid for spectrum, has led to concerns that the government may fail to maximize revenues.

Suggested Citation

  • Choi, Yong-Jae, 2022. "Spectrum auctions in a thin market: The Korean case," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(8).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:46:y:2022:i:8:s0308596122000714
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2022.102369
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    References listed on IDEAS

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