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Brokerage in commercialised healthcare systems: A conceptual framework and empirical evidence from Uttar Pradesh

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  • Hunter, Benjamin M.

Abstract

In many contexts there are a range of individuals and organisations offering healthcare services that differ widely in cost, quality and outcomes. This complexity is exacerbated by processes of healthcare commercialisation. Yet reliable information on healthcare provision is often limited, and progress to and through the healthcare system may depend on knowledge drawn from prior experiences, social networks and the providers themselves. It is in these contexts that healthcare brokerage emerges and third-party actors facilitate access to healthcare.

Suggested Citation

  • Hunter, Benjamin M., 2018. "Brokerage in commercialised healthcare systems: A conceptual framework and empirical evidence from Uttar Pradesh," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 128-135.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:socmed:v:202:y:2018:i:c:p:128-135
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2018.03.004
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