The pitfalls of transition: Crowding out the "National Virtues"
AbstractIn this paper a view is advanced that explains why the transition to markets did not always lead to the outcomes predicted by the Washington Consensus type strategies. Institutional portfolio theory is used to define a myriad of interests and goals of a transition economy. A model is developed in which external intervention and increased external monitoring are shown to lead to lessening of the intrinsic motivation within transition economies to pursue the reforms as prescribed by Washington Consensus sometimes resulting in very slow growth rates or even a decline of the GDP.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal The Journal of Socio-Economics.
Volume (Year): 37 (2008)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175
Economic transition External monitoring Institutional portfolio theory Washington Consensus;
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