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Can compulsory liability insurance reduce agency costs? Evidence from China

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  • Wang, Di
  • Liu, Guangqiang
  • Xie, Linlin

Abstract

This paper discusses the impact mechanism of compulsory liability insurance on agency costs. Studying the companies listed in China’s food manufacturing industries in 2011–2018, we find that compulsory liability insurance significantly reduces the two types of agency costs, namely, alleviating the principal-agent problem and the principal–principal problem. Robustness tests confirm this finding. The reduction of information asymmetry and the improvement of internal control quality are the mechanisms leading to this result. Compulsory food safety liability insurance plays a significant role in reducing agency costs when company ownership is concentrated or when media coverage is high. This paper provides empirical evidence for joint regulation by the public and private sectors, also provides theoretical reference for further optimizing food safety governance mode.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Di & Liu, Guangqiang & Xie, Linlin, 2023. "Can compulsory liability insurance reduce agency costs? Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:65:y:2023:i:c:s0275531923000922
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2023.101966
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Compulsory liability insurance; Food industry; Agency cost; Information asymmetry; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy; Animal Welfare Policy

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