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The power of the pen and executive compensation

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Author Info

  • Core, John E.
  • Guay, Wayne
  • Larcker, David F.
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    Abstract

    We examine the press' role in monitoring and influencing executive compensation practice using more than 11,000 press articles about CEO compensation from 1994 to 2002. Negative press coverage is more strongly related to excess annual pay than to raw annual pay, suggesting a sophisticated approach by the media in selecting CEOs to cover. However, negative coverage is also greater for CEOs with more option exercises, suggesting the press engages in some degree of "sensationalism." We find little evidence that firms respond to negative press coverage by decreasing excess CEO compensation or increasing CEO turnover.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBX-4R8WK35-1/1/1d328a058a3b318bf6d255a1b42918e5
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

    Volume (Year): 88 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 1 (April)
    Pages: 1-25

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:88:y:2008:i:1:p:1-25

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 2002. "The Corporate Governance Role of the Media," NBER Working Papers 9309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Leslie E. Papke & Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 1993. "Econometric Methods for Fractional Response Variables with an Application to 401(k) Plan Participation Rates," NBER Technical Working Papers 0147, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier.
    4. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, 2003. "The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong?," NBER Working Papers 9613, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Dyck, Alexander & Zingales, Luigi, 2002. "Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison," CEPR Discussion Papers 3177, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2000. "Stock Options for Undiversified Executives," NBER Working Papers 8052, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Luigi Zingales, 2000. "In Search of New Foundations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(4), pages 1623-1653, 08.
    8. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
    9. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    10. Dial, Jay & Murphy, Kevin J., 1995. "Incentives, downsizing, and value creation at General Dynamics," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 261-314, March.
    11. Gregory S. Miller, 2006. "The Press as a Watchdog for Accounting Fraud," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(5), pages 1001-1033, December.
    12. Heron, Randall A. & Lie, Erik, 2007. "Does backdating explain the stock price pattern around executive stock option grants?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 271-295, February.
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    Cited by:
    1. Karen Moris, 2010. "La presse en tant que mécanisme de gouvernance disciplinaire - Press as a disciplinary governance mechanism," Working Papers FARGO 1101003, Université de Bourgogne - Crego EA 7317/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
    2. Kuhnen, Camelia M. & Niessen, Alexandra, 2010. "Public opinion and executive compensation," CFR Working Papers 08-09 [rev.], University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    3. Larcker, David F. & McCall, Allan L. & Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2012. "The Economic Consequences of Proxy Advisor Say-on-Pay Voting Policies," Research Papers 2105, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    4. Dechow, Patricia M. & Myers, Linda A. & Shakespeare, Catherine, 2010. "Fair value accounting and gains from asset securitizations: A convenient earnings management tool with compensation side-benefits," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1-2), pages 2-25, February.
    5. Chen, Chia-Wei & Yi, Bingsheng & Lin, J. Barry, 2013. "Media coverage, board structure and CEO compensation: Evidence from Taiwan," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 434-445.
    6. Andrew Carrothers & Seungjin Han & Jiaping Qiu, 2012. "CEO Pay with Perks," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-05, McMaster University.
    7. Claudio Loderer & René Stulz & Urs Waelchli, 2013. "Limited Managerial Attention and Corporate Aging," NBER Working Papers 19428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Pryshchepa, Oksana & Aretz, Kevin & Banerjee, Shantanu, 2013. "Can investors restrict managerial behavior in distressed firms?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 222-239.
    9. Frydman, Carola & Molloy, Raven S., 2011. "Does tax policy affect executive compensation? Evidence from postwar tax reforms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1425-1437.
    10. Hsu, Audrey Wen-hsin & Wang, Tawei, 2013. "Does the market value corporate response to climate change?," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 195-206.
    11. Mohamed Khenissi & Peter Wirtz, 2013. "Processus Decisionnel En Matiere De Remuneration Des Dirigeants : Le Cas Vinci," Working Papers halshs-00850083, HAL.
    12. Karen Moris, 2011. "La presse en tant que mécanisme de gouvernance disciplinaire," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 14(4), pages 21-66, December.
    13. Houston, Joel F. & Lin, Chen & Ma, Yue, 2011. "Media ownership, concentration and corruption in bank lending," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 326-350, May.
    14. Larcker, David F. & Ormazabal, Gaizka & Taylor, Daniel J., 2011. "The market reaction to corporate governance regulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 431-448, August.
    15. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Gow, Ian D. & Larcker, David F., 2012. "The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans," Research Papers 2097, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.

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