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Rules transparency and political accountability

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  • Bordignon, Massimo
  • Minelli, Enrico

Abstract

Allocative and redistributive rules in the public sector are often less contingent on available information than normative theory would suggest. This paper offers a political economy explanation. Under different rules, even if the observable outcomes of policies remain the same, the informational content which can be extracted by these observations is different. Simpler rules are more transparent because they allow citizens to gain more information on politicians. Since there are limits to what voters can observe, this may be a relevant insight into the functioning of the political system.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 80 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 73-98

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:80:y:2001:i:1:p:73-98

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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References

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  1. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1999. "Transparency, reputation, and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 31-50, October.
  2. Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Collusion and the Theory of Organizations," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 9, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  3. McLennan, Andrew, 1985. "Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 889-904, July.
  4. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-56, March.
  5. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
  6. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
  7. Joel Slemrod, 1989. "Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems," NBER Working Papers 3038, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
  9. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
  10. Arvind Panagariya & Dani Rodrik, 1991. "Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff," NBER Working Papers 3661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bordignon, Massimo & Manasse, Paolo & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Optimal Regional Redistribution Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1437, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Agnese Sacchi & Simone Salotti, 2014. "The influence of decentralized taxes and intergovernmental grants on local spending volatility," Working Papers, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network 1405, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.
  3. Canegrati, Emanuele, 2006. "Yardstick competition: a spatial voting model approach," MPRA Paper 1017, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Paolo Liberati & Agnese Sacchi, 2010. "Tax Decentralisation and local Government size," Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' 0123, Department of Economics - University Roma Tre.
  5. Canegrati, Emanuele, 2006. "Political Bad Reputation," MPRA Paper 1018, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Agnese Sacchi & Simone Salotti, 2012. "A comprehensive anlysis of expenditure decentralization and of the composition of local public spending," Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' 0155, Department of Economics - University Roma Tre.
  7. Massimo Bordignon & Santino Piazza, 2010. "Who do you blame in local finance? An analysis of municipal financing in Italy," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0094, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  8. Massimo Bordignon & Floriana Cerniglia & Federico Revelli, 2002. "In Search for Yardstick Competition: Property Tax Rates and Electoral Behavior in Italian Cities," CESifo Working Paper Series 644, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Bracco, Emanuele & Porcelli, Francesco & Redoano, Michela, 2013. "Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability: Theory and Some Evidence from Italy," CAGE Online Working Paper Series, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) 126, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
  10. Sacchi, Agnese & Salotti, Simone, 2014. "The asymmetric nature of fiscal decentralization: theory and practice," MPRA Paper 54506, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Massimo Bordignon, 2000. "Problems of Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Relationships: The Case of Italy," Research Department Publications, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department 3099, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  12. Bordignon, Massimo & Cerniglia, Floriana & Revelli, Federico, 2004. "Yardstick competition in intergovernmental relationships: theory and empirical predictions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-333, June.
  13. Brender, Adi, 2003. "The effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in Israel: 1989-1998," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2187-2205, September.
  14. Maria Alessandra Antonelli, 2009. "Citizens' Information and the Size of Bureaucracy," Annals of the University of Petrosani, Economics, University of Petrosani, Romania, University of Petrosani, Romania, vol. 9(1), pages 17-26.
  15. Massimo Bordignon, 2007. "Exit and Voice. Yardstick versus Fiscal Competition across Governments," CESifo Working Paper Series 2069, CESifo Group Munich.

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