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Rules transparency and political accountability

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Author Info
Bordignon, Massimo
Minelli, Enrico

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Abstract

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-42992T5-4/2/c8506a1a65b606c9918d46018feda7e0
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 80 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 73-98
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:80:y:2001:i:1:p:73-98

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  1. Canegrati, Emanuele, 2006. "Yardstick competition: a spatial voting model approach," MPRA Paper 1017, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Canegrati, Emanuele, 2006. "Political Bad Reputation," MPRA Paper 1018, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Massimo Bordignon & Paolo Manasse & Guido Tabellini, 2001. "Optimal Regional Redistribution under Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 709-723, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Bordignon, Massimo & Cerniglia, Floriana & Revelli, Federico, 2002. "In Search for Yardstick Competition: Property Tax Rates and Electoral Behavior in Italian Cities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  5. Massimo Bordignon, 2007. "Exit and Voice. Yardstick versus Fiscal Competition across Governments," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-20.

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