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How does group identification affect redistribution in representative democracies? An Experiment

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  • Hargreaves Heap, Shaun P.
  • Manifold, Emma
  • Matakos, Konstantinos
  • Xefteris, Dimitrios

Abstract

We test in the laboratory four mechanisms whereby group identification might affect redistribution in representative democracies. For voters, group identification can give rise to a preference for own-group payoffs, for electing an own-group candidate, and could be used to assess candidate-sincerity. For candidates, identity might affect the optimal campaign platform. There is evidence to support all four. Our key contribution comes from bringing the candidate supply of redistribution policies into an equilibrium analysis with voter demand for redistribution. It yields an important new insight: the extent of minority group political representation among the electoral candidates critically affects redistribution outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Hargreaves Heap, Shaun P. & Manifold, Emma & Matakos, Konstantinos & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2022. "How does group identification affect redistribution in representative democracies? An Experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:215:y:2022:i:c:s0047272722001499
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104747
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Identity; Inequality; Redistribution; Minority Representation; Representative Democracy; Voting Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

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