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Voter turnout and government's legitimate mandate

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  • Grillo, Alberto

Abstract

The paper studies a group-mobilization model of costly voting in which citizens care about the legitimate mandate of the government formed by the winning group. This, as a function of the electorate's voting behavior, depends on both the margin of victory and the total turnout rate. Citizens prefer a high mandate when their own group forms the government but a low one if the government is formed by an opposing group. As such, the eventual losing group faces a trade-off: a higher participation from its members decreases the margin of victory but increases the total turnout. In equilibrium, a second fundamental trade-off arises, which overturns the supposed positive relationship between turnout and mandate: as the total turnout becomes more important for the government's mandate, the first decreases but the second strengthens. The key mechanism at play is a shift in the relative participation of the two groups, which favors the majority and raises its margin of victory, thus yielding a bandwagon effect. The implications for the evolution of turnout and the occurrence of election boycotts are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Grillo, Alberto, 2019. "Voter turnout and government's legitimate mandate," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 252-265.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:59:y:2019:i:c:p:252-265
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.03.004
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    Cited by:

    1. Cipullo, Davide & Le Moglie, Marco, 2022. "To vote, or not to vote? Electoral campaigns and the spread of COVID-19," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voter turnout; Legitimacy; Mandate; Costly voting; Bandwagon;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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