IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pacfin/v78y2023ics0927538x23000380.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Earnings management, horizon problem, and advisor posts for retiring CEOs

Author

Listed:
  • Ishida, Souhei
  • Ogoe, Satoshi
  • Suzuki, Katsushi

Abstract

An advisor post is one of the most important post-retirement careers for a chief executive officer (CEO). Using unique hand-collected data on advisor posts in Japanese listed firms, we examine whether retiring CEOs overstate earnings to acquire an advisor post. Consistent with the horizon problem, we find that earnings overstatement is greater in the year immediately before the CEO's post-retirement career is determined to be an advisor. This relation is also more (less) pronounced for firms with weaker (stronger) internal monitoring. These results suggest that retiring CEOs choose income-increasing accounting to acquire an advisor position, and such opportunistic accounting choice is more (less) pronounced in firms with weaker (stronger) internal monitoring.

Suggested Citation

  • Ishida, Souhei & Ogoe, Satoshi & Suzuki, Katsushi, 2023. "Earnings management, horizon problem, and advisor posts for retiring CEOs," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:78:y:2023:i:c:s0927538x23000380
    DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2023.101972
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X23000380
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.pacfin.2023.101972?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeff L. McMullin & Bryce Schonberger, 2020. "Entropy-balanced accruals," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 84-119, March.
    2. Brickley, James A. & Linck, James S. & Coles, Jeffrey L., 1999. "What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 341-377, June.
    3. Jones, Jj, 1991. "Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 193-228.
    4. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    5. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
    6. Zmijewski, Mark E. & Hagerman, Robert L., 1981. "An income strategy approach to the positive theory of accounting standard setting/choice," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 129-149, August.
    7. Kim, Irene & Skinner, Douglas J., 2012. "Measuring securities litigation risk," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 290-310.
    8. Cory A. Cassell & Linda A. Myers & Roy Schmardebeck & Jian Zhou, 2018. "The Monitoring Effectiveness of Co‐opted Audit Committees," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 35(4), pages 1732-1765, December.
    9. Dechow, Patricia M. & Sloan, Richard G., 1991. "Executive incentives and the horizon problem : An empirical investigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 51-89, March.
    10. Roychowdhury, Sugata, 2006. "Earnings management through real activities manipulation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 335-370, December.
    11. Khan, Mozaffar & Watts, Ross L., 2009. "Estimation and empirical properties of a firm-year measure of accounting conservatism," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2-3), pages 132-150, December.
    12. C. Edward Fee, 2003. "Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 16(4), pages 1315-1357.
    13. Hazarika, Sonali & Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Nahata, Rajarishi, 2012. "Internal corporate governance, CEO turnover, and earnings management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 44-69.
    14. Kaplan, Steven N, 1994. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 510-546, June.
    15. Hainmueller, Jens & Xu, Yiqing, 2013. "ebalance: A Stata Package for Entropy Balancing," Journal of Statistical Software, Foundation for Open Access Statistics, vol. 54(i07).
    16. Ali, Ashiq & Zhang, Weining, 2015. "CEO tenure and earnings management," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 60-79.
    17. Mitchell A. Petersen, 2009. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 435-480, January.
    18. Miyajima, Hideaki & Ogawa, Ryo & Saito, Takuji, 2018. "Changes in corporate governance and top executive turnover: The evidence from Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 17-31.
    19. Martin Jacob & Roni Michaely & Maximilian A Müller, 2019. "Consumption Taxes and Corporate Investment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(8), pages 3144-3182.
    20. Hideaki Miyajima & Ryo Ogawa & Takuji Saito, 2018. "Changes in Corporate Governance and Top Executive Turnover: The Evidence from Japan," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Governance (NBER-TCER-CEPR Conference), National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Kasznik, R, 1999. "On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 57-81.
    22. Kothari, S.P. & Leone, Andrew J. & Wasley, Charles E., 2005. "Performance matched discretionary accrual measures," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 163-197, February.
    23. Chino, Atsushi, 2021. "Alternative Work Arrangements and Cost of Equity: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 569-606, March.
    24. John Harry Evans & Nandu J. Nagarajan & Jason D. Schloetzer, 2010. "CEO Turnover and Retention Light: Retaining Former CEOs on the Board," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(5), pages 1015-1047, December.
    25. Klein, April, 2002. "Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 375-400, August.
    26. Murphy, Kevin J. & Zimmerman, Jerold L., 1993. "Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 273-315, April.
    27. Hagerman, Robert L. & Zmijewski, Mark E., 1979. "Some economic determinants of accounting policy choice," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 141-161, August.
    28. Warfield, Terry D. & Wild, John J. & Wild, Kenneth L., 1995. "Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 61-91, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ogoe, Satoshi & Suzuki, Katsushi, 2023. "Former CEO advisors and firm performance," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ali, Ashiq & Zhang, Weining, 2015. "CEO tenure and earnings management," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 60-79.
    2. Dechow, Patricia & Ge, Weili & Schrand, Catherine, 2010. "Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 344-401, December.
    3. Chen, Tai-Yuan & Zhang, Guochang & Zhou, Yi, 2018. "Enforceability of non-compete covenants, discretionary investments, and financial reporting practices: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 41-60.
    4. Florackis, Chris & Sainani, Sushil, 2021. "Can CFOs resist undue pressure from CEOs to manage earnings?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    5. Fields, Thomas D. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Vincent, Linda, 2001. "Empirical research on accounting choice," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 255-307, September.
    6. Ishida, Souhei & Kochiyama, Takuma, 2020. "ISS’s Proxy Voting Guidelines and ROE Management," Working Paper Series 235, Management Innovation Research Center, School of Business Administration, Hitotsubashi University Business School.
    7. Jong-Seo Choi & Young-Min Kwak & Chongwoo Choe, 2014. "Earnings Management Surrounding CEO Turnover: Evidence from Korea," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 50(1), pages 25-55, March.
    8. Murad Antia & Christos Pantzalis & Jung Chul Park, 2021. "Does CEO myopia impede growth opportunities?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1503-1535, May.
    9. Griffin, Paul A. & Hong, Hyun A. & Liu, Yun & Ryou, Ji Woo, 2021. "The dark side of CEO social capital: Evidence from real earnings management and future operating performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    10. Jun Hyeok Choi & Saerona Kim & Ayoung Lee, 2019. "CEO Tenure, Corporate Social Performance, and Corporate Governance: A Korean Study," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-17, December.
    11. Godsell, David & Huang, Kelly & Lao, Brent, 2023. "Managers’ rank & file employee coordination costs and real activities manipulation," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    12. Ali Meftah Gerged & Khaldoon Albitar & Lara Al‐Haddad, 2023. "Corporate environmental disclosure and earnings management—The moderating role of corporate governance structures," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(3), pages 2789-2810, July.
    13. Jiang, Fuxiu & Zhu, Bing & Huang, Jicheng, 2013. "CEO's financial experience and earnings management," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 134-145.
    14. Kuo, Jing-Ming & Ning, Lutao & Song, Xiaoqi, 2014. "The Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management Behaviors: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 101-136.
    15. Jiang, Fuxiu & Ma, Yunbiao & Wang, Xue, 2020. "Multiple blockholders and earnings management," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    16. Conyon, Martin J. & Florou, Annita, 2006. "The pattern of investment surrounding CEO retirements: UK evidence," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 299-319.
    17. Rajiv D. Banker & Dmitri Byzalov & Shunlan Fang & Byunghoon Jin, 2020. "Operating asymmetries and non-linear spline correction in discretionary accrual models," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 803-850, April.
    18. Frerich Buchholz & Kerstin Lopatta & Karen Maas, 2020. "The Deliberate Engagement of Narcissistic CEOs in Earnings Management," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 167(4), pages 663-686, December.
    19. Jennifer Martínez-Ferrero, 2014. "Consequences of financial reporting quality on corporate performance. Evidence at the international level," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 41(1 Year 20), pages 49-88, June.
    20. 石田, 惣平 & ISHIDA, Souhei & 蜂谷, 豊彦 & HACHIYA, Toyohiko, 2018. "経営者の在任期間と目標利益達成を意図した利益調整, Top Executive Tenure and Earnings Management to Meet Earnings Target," Working Paper Series 197, Center for Japanese Business Studies (HJBS), Graduate School of Commerce and Management Hitotsubashi University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Earnings management; Horizon problem; Advisor; CEO post-retirement career; Co-opted board; Board independence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:78:y:2023:i:c:s0927538x23000380. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/pacfin .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.