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Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting

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  • Segal-Halevi, Erel
  • Sziklai, Balázs R.

Abstract

In the classic cake-cutting problem (Steinhaus, 1948), a heterogeneous resource has to be divided among n agents with different valuations in a proportional way —giving each agent a piece with a value of at least 1∕n of the total. In many applications, such as dividing a land-estate or a time-interval, it is also important that the pieces are connected. We propose two additional requirements: resource-monotonicity (RM) and population-monotonicity (PM). When either the cake or the set of agents grows or shrinks and the cake is re-divided using the same rule, the utility of all remaining agents must change in the same direction. Classic cake-cutting protocols are neither RM nor PM. Moreover, we prove that no Pareto-optimal proportional division rule can be either RM or PM. Motivated by this negative result, we search for division rules that are weakly-Pareto-optimal — no other division is strictly better for all agents. We present two such rules. The relative-equitable rule, which assigns the maximum possible relative value equal for all agents, is proportional and PM. The so-called rightmost mark rule, which is an improved version of the Cut and Choose protocol, is proportional and RM for two agents.

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  • Segal-Halevi, Erel & Sziklai, Balázs R., 2018. "Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 19-30.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:95:y:2018:i:c:p:19-30
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.07.001
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    1. Josué Ortega & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2022. "Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(4), pages 969-988, November.
    2. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2022. "Monotonicity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 297(1), pages 338-346.
    3. Anna Bogomolnaia & Herve Moulin & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Elena Yanovskaya, 2016. "Dividing Goods or Bads Under Additive Utilities," HSE Working papers WP BRP 147/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    4. Erel Segal-Halevi & Shmuel Nitzan, 2019. "Fair cake-cutting among families," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(4), pages 709-740, December.
    5. Anna Bogomolnaia & Hervé Moulin & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Elena Yanovskaya, 2017. "Competitive Division of a Mixed Manna," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1847-1871, November.
    6. Erel Segal-Halevi & Balázs R. Sziklai, 2019. "Monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake-cutting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(2), pages 363-401, September.
    7. Chèze, Guillaume, 2019. "Cake cutting: Explicit examples for impossibility results," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 68-72.

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