Updating our beliefs about inconsistency: The Monty-Hall case
AbstractIn the experiments on the Monty-Hall puzzle, a large majority of participants give a different response from the Experimenters' Bayesian solution. We analyze this discrepancy as a problem of interpretation of the revision process of probabilities, induced by the statement of the Monty-Hall puzzle. Experimenters' solution actually stems from a traditional focusing situation, whereas participants may, for pragmatic reasons, build an updating representation of the puzzle. We establish that the descriptive explanations for participants' modal response provided by the psychological literature on Monty-Hall such as the ones based on heuristics can be translated into the adequate rule of revision in this updating framework.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 57 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Monty-Hall puzzle Situations of probabilities' revision Cognitive explanations Consistency;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Craig R. Fox & Robert T. Clemen, 2005. "Subjective Probability Assessment in Decision Analysis: Partition Dependence and Bias Toward the Ignorance Prior," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(9), pages 1417-1432, September.
- Ronald Fagin & John Geanakoplos & Joseph Y. Halpern & Moshe Y. Vardi, 1999.
"The Hierarchical Approach to Modeling Knowledge and Common Knowledge,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1213, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- John Geanakoplos & (**), Moshe Y. Vardi & Joseph Y. Halpern & Ronald Fagin, 1999. "The hierarchical approach to modeling knowledge and common knowledge," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 331-365.
- Billot, Antoine & Walliser, Bernard, 1999. "Epistemic properties of knowledge hierarchies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 185-205, October.
- Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer, 2007. "The psychology of dynamic probability judgment: order effect, normative theories, and experimental methodology," Mind and Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 6(1), pages 53-66, June.
- Brian D. Kluger & Steve B. Wyatt, 2004. "Are Judgment Errors Reflected in Market Prices and Allocations? Experimental Evidence Based on the Monty Hall Problem," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(3), pages 969-998, 06.
- Sloman, Steven A. & Over, David & Slovak, Lila & Stibel, Jeffrey M., 2003. "Frequency illusions and other fallacies," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 296-309, July.
- Bryan Caplan, 2000. "Rational Irrationality: A Framework for the Neoclassical-Behavioral Debate," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 191-211, Spring.
- Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer, 2006. "Is the mind Bayesian? The case for agnosticism," Mind and Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 5(1), pages 1-38, June.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.