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On the existence of the ex post symmetric random entry model

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  • Hu, Ju

Abstract

This paper studies symmetry among countably infinitely many agents who randomly enter into a stochastic process, one for each period. Upon entry, they observe only the current period signal and try to draw inference about the underlying state governing the stochastic process. We show that there exist random entry models under which agents are ex post symmetric. That is, all agents have identical posterior belief about the underlying states, although they are not ex ante symmetric. The form of the posterior belief is uniquely pinned down by ex post symmetry and a stationarity condition. Our results provide a common prior foundation for the model studied in Liu and Skrzypacz (2014).

Suggested Citation

  • Hu, Ju, 2020. "On the existence of the ex post symmetric random entry model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 42-47.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:90:y:2020:i:c:p:42-47
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Monzón, Ignacio & Rapp, Michael, 2014. "Observational learning with position uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 375-402.
    2. Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2014. "Limited records and reputation bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 2-29.
    3. Guarino, Antonio & Harmgart, Heike & Huck, Steffen, 2011. "Aggregate information cascades," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 167-185, September.
    4. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796, Decembrie.
    5. Boylan, Richard T., 1992. "Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 473-504, August.
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