Aggregate information cascades
AbstractWe introduce a new model of aggregate information cascades where only one of two possible actions is observable to others. Agents make a binary decision in sequence. The order is random and agents are not aware of their own position in the sequence. When called upon, they are only informed about the total number of others who have chosen the observable action before them. This informational structure arises naturally in many applications. Our most important result is that only one type of cascade arises in equilibrium, the aggregate cascade on the observable action. A cascade on the unobservable action never arises.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 73 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Social learning Information cascades Information aggregation Herd behavior;
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