Competitive equilibrium with moral hazard in economies with multiple commodities
AbstractWe study an economy with competitive commodity markets and exclusive pairwise contractual relations with moral hazard, where both the principal and the agent can be risk averse. We show existence of equilibria and their generic constrained suboptimality,
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 38 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (September)
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Other versions of this item:
- Alessandro Citanna & Antonio Villanacci, 1997. "Competitive equilibrium with moral hazard in economies with multiple commodities," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business 136, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
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