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Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information

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Author Info
Bisin, Alberto
Gottardi, Piero

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45FKP0H-1K/2/e7aeef8908c9a01f2ef9722a31927c5d
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 87 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 1-48
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:87:y:1999:i:1:p:1-48

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  1. Alberto Bisin & Danilo Guaitoli, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts," Economics Working Papers 345, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Jacques Drèze & Enrico Minelli & Mario Tirelli, 2008. "Production and financial policies under asymmetric information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 217-231, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 2001. "Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1304R5, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Mar 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Belen Jerez, 2005. "Incentive Compatibility and Pricing under Moral Hazard," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(1), pages 28-47, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Andrea, ATTAR & Eloisa, CAMPIONI & Gwenaël, PIASER, 2005. "Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2005024, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Orazio Attanasio & Nicola Pavoni, 2007. "Risk Sharing in Private Information Models with Asset Accumulation: Explaining the Excess Smoothness of Consumption," NBER Working Papers 12994, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Erik Hurst & Paul Willen, 2004. "Social Security and unsecured debt," Public Policy Discussion Paper 04-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi, 2003. "Competitive Markets for Non-Exclusive Contracts with Adverse Selection: the Role of Entry Fees," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 313-338, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi, 2005. "Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi, 2000. "Decentralizing Incentive Efficient Allocations of Economies with Adverse Selection," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0855, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  11. Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Edward Prescott, 2000. "Lotteries, Sunspots and Incentive Constraints," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1974, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Bel? Jerez, 2000. "General Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information: a Dual Approach," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 510.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Joon Song, 2007. "Futures Market: Contractual Arrangement to Restrain Moral Hazard in Teams," Economics Discussion Papers 633, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi & Danilo Guaitoli, 1998. "A Note on the Convergence to Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Moral Hazard," Economics Working Papers 381, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Martin Hellwig, 2004. "Nonlinear Incentive Provision in Walrasian Markets: A Cournot Convergence Approach," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004_8, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Bel? Jerez, 2001. "A Dual Characterization of Incentive Efficiency," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 494.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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  17. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006. "Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000445, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Steven J. Davis & Felix Kubler & Paul Willen, 2005. "Borrowing costs and the demand for equity over the life cycle," Working Papers 05-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Nuno Gouveia, 2004. "General equilibrium with asymmetric information and default penalties," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b05051, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), revised Jan 2005. [Downloadable!]
  20. Xavier Vives, 2000. "Allocative and Productive Efficiency in REE with Asymetric Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 473.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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