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Regulating opportunism in the electricity industry and consumer interests

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  • Niesten, Eva
  • Jolink, Albert

Abstract

This article presents evidence on opportunistic behaviour by network operators in the liberalized British, Dutch and French electricity industries. The evidence is supplied by 303 regulatory decisions on dispute resolutions for the period 2002–2010. We observe a significant difference in how the regulators resolve disputes between network operators and producers on the one hand, and between network operators and consumers on the other hand. Consumers are negatively affected by the opportunistic behaviour of network operators, mainly by paying tariffs that are higher than is allowed by law. Policy recommendations focus on the protection of consumer interests in competitive electricity markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Niesten, Eva & Jolink, Albert, 2012. "Regulating opportunism in the electricity industry and consumer interests," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 38-45.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:20:y:2012:i:1:p:38-45
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2011.11.004
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    Cited by:

    1. Codruţa Mare & Simona Laura Dragoş & Dan Tudor Lazăr & Cristian Mihai Dragoş, 2013. "Consumer protection through prices: an analysis of the energetic sector in European Union countries," The AMFITEATRU ECONOMIC journal, Academy of Economic Studies - Bucharest, Romania, vol. 15(34), pages 327-341, June.
    2. Ruiz Díaz, Gonzalo, 2019. "Opportunism and third-party influence on long-term public contracts," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    3. Eva Niesten & Albert Jolink, 2014. "Absence of a market in the Dutch balancing mechanism: European rules versus specific investments," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 71-90, August.
    4. Annesi, Nora & Battaglia, Massimo & Sganzetta, Lorenza, 2023. "Mutual benefits of sustainability integration in the value chain: Responsible innovation by public utilities," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).

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