Revenue-raising taxes: General equilibrium evaluation of alternative taxation in U.S. petroleum industries
AbstractShould the United States increase taxes and tariffs in the energy sector to reduce its federal deficit? This paper uses a twelve sector general equilibrium model to estimate the fiscal effects, and the effects on welfare and employment, of : (i) a 25 percent import tax on imported crude petroleum oil; (ii) a 15 percent excise tax on petroleum products; and (iii) a combination of the two. The excise tax would be the most efficient revenue raising instrument. The 25 percent import tariff would raise US$7.3 billion, while the 15 percent excise tax would raise US$35 billion. Moreover, each dollar raised through a tariff would come at a loss of 25 cents in welfare. Each dollar raised through an excise tax would come at a loss of only one cent in welfare. Acombination of excise taxes, subsidies, and import tariffs would be the least costly way (in terms of welfare) to raise US$20 billion. The optimal tax structure would involve a tariff and a small subsidy on petroleum products to counteract the distortion induced by a tax on oil - the most important input for petroleum products.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Policy Modeling.
Volume (Year): 11 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505735
Other versions of this item:
- de Melo, Jaime & Stanton, Julie & Tarr, David, 1989. "Revenue raising taxes : general equilibrium evaluation of alternative taxation in U.S. petroleum industries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 145, The World Bank.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Scarf,Herbert E. & Shoven,John B., 2008. "Applied General Equilibrium Analysis," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521070935, December.
- de Melo, Jaime & Tarr, David, 1988.
"Welfare costs of U.S. quotas on textiles, steel, and autos,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
83, The World Bank.
- de Melo, Jaime & Tarr, David, 1990. "Welfare Costs of U.S. Quotas in Textiles, Steel and Autos," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 72(3), pages 489-97, August.
- de Melo, Jaime & Tarr, David, 1990. "Welfare Costs of US Quotas in Textiles, Steel and Autos," CEPR Discussion Papers 401, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Harris, Richard G. & Mackinnon, James G., 1979. "Computing optimal tax equilibria," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 197-212, March.
- Vern Caddy, 1976. "Empirical Estimation of the Elasticity of Substitution : A Review," Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre Working Papers op-09, Victoria University, Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre.
- Dixit, Avinash, 1985. "Tax policy in open economies," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 313-374 Elsevier.
- de Melo, Jaime & Tarr, David, 1996.
"VERs under imperfect competition and foreign direct investment: A case study of the US-Japan auto VER,"
Japan and the World Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 11-33, March.
- de Melo, J. & Tarr, D., 1994. "VERs Under Imperfect Competition and Foreing Direct Investment: A Case study of the US-Japan Auto VER," Research Papers by the Department of Economics, University of Geneva 94.09, Département des Sciences Économiques, Université de Genève.
- de Melo, Jaime & Tarr, David, 1995. "VERs Under Imperfect Competition and Foreign Direct Investment: A Case Study of the US-Japan Auto VER," CEPR Discussion Papers 1173, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- de Melo, Jaime & Tarr, David, 1991. "VERs under imperfect competition and foreign direct investment : a case study of the U.S. - Japan auto VER," Policy Research Working Paper Series 667, The World Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.