Money-back guarantee and pricing decision with retailer's store brand

This paper investigates the money-back guarantee (MBG) choice problem in the presence of store brand introduction in a two-echelon supply chain consisted of one manufacturer and one retailer. Game-theoretic models with different MBG policies regarding the national brand and the store brand are examined. We found that the MBG policy could be a strategic tool to help the retailer developing its store brand even when a fairer policy is chosen by the retailer and the store brand is considered by consumers as a low-end substitute for the national brand. The presence of MBG is beneficial to the retailer while unfavorable to the manufacturer, even though the retailer provides a fairer MBG policy, i.e., MBG for both two brands. Although the national brand has advantages over the store brand, MBG will increase the competition and cause customer shifting from the national brand to store brand and thus bring a profit loss for the manufacturer. Moreover, we have found that the manufacturer could provide coordinate contracts for the retailer to improve its performance with which a win-win outcome could be reached for both the manufacturer and the retailer.