When should homeless families get subsidized apartments? A theoretical inquiry
AbstractHow and when should operators of homeless shelters place families from these shelters into subsidized housing? I apply the tools of contract theory to this problem, especially some approaches that have been taken to optimal unemployment insurance. The problem combines moral hazard and adverse selection. When all families are drawn from the same distribution, placement should occur immediately. When families are heterogeneous, the optimal strategy creates a separating equilibrium. Good searchers self-select into a contract with high probability of immediate placement and no probability of later placement; poorer searchers self-select into a contract with a lower probability of immediate placement but a positive probability of later placement.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Housing Economics.
Volume (Year): 18 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622881
Homelessness Homeless shelters Optimal contract menus;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Shavell, Steven & Weiss, Laurence, 1979.
"The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1347-62, December.
- Steven Shavell & Laurence Weiss, 1978. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 503, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Marcus Hagedorn & Ashok Kaul & Tim Mennel, 2007. "An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," IEW - Working Papers 315, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Dennis P. Culhane & Stephen Metraux & Jung Min Park & Maryanne Schretzman & Jesse Valente, 2007. "Testing a typology of family homelessness based on patterns of public shelter utilization in four U.S. jurisdictions: Implications for policy and program planning," Housing Policy Debate, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 18(1), pages 1-28, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.