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Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers

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Author Info

  • Hairault, Jean-Olivier
  • Langot, François
  • Ménard, Sébastien
  • Sopraseuth, Thepthida

Abstract

This paper shows that optimal unemployment insurance contracts are age-dependent. Older workers have only a few years left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more decreasing replacement ratio. However, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract. It is the result of the inability to reconcile both incentives and insurance for the soon-to-be-retired unemployed workers. We show that the unemployment benefit agency could take advantage of the retirement period to tax pensions in order to optimize the trade-off between insurance and incentives at the end of working life.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CEPREMAP in its series CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) with number 1107.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpm:docweb:1107

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Related research

Keywords: Unemployment insurance; Retirement; Recursive contracts; Moral Hazard;

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References

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  1. Joseph Stiglitz & Jungyoll Yun, 2002. "Integration of Unemployment Insurance with Retirement Insurance," NBER Working Papers 9199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Christopher Phelan & Robert M Townsend, 2010. "Computing Multi-Period, Information Constrained Optima," Levine's Working Paper Archive 117, David K. Levine.
  3. Robert Shimer & Ivan Werning, 2005. "Liquidity and Insurance for the Unemployed," NBER Working Papers 11689, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pestieau, Pierre, 2004. "Social security, retirement age and optimal income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(11), pages 2259-2281, September.
  5. Hagedorn, Marcus & Kaul, Ashok & Mennel, Tim, 2002. "An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," IZA Discussion Papers 681, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Fredriksson, P. & Holmlund, B., 1998. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium," Papers 1998-2, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
  7. Jean-Olivier Hairault & François Langot & Thepthida Sopraseuth, 2010. "Distance to Retirement and The Job Search of Older Workers: The Case For Delaying Retirement Age," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00517107, HAL.
  8. Nicola Pavoni, 2009. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance, With Human Capital Depreciation, And Duration Dependence," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(2), pages 323-362, 05.
  9. Spear, Stephen E & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617, October.
  10. Arnaud Chéron & Jean‐Olivier Hairault & François Langot, 2011. "Age‐Dependent Employment Protection," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(557), pages 1477-1504, December.
  11. Hagedorn, Marcus & Kaul, Ashok & Mennel, Tim, 2002. "An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance," ZEI Working Papers B 30-2002, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
  12. Adrian Masters & Melvyn Coles, 2004. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in a Matching Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 04-12, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
  13. Steven Shavell & Laurence Weiss, 1978. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 503, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  14. Guido Menzio & Irina A. Telyukova & Ludo Visschers, 2012. "Directed Search over the Life Cycle," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  15. Jean-Olivier Hairault & Francois Langot & Thepthida Sopraseuth, 2010. "Distance to Retirement and Older Workers' Employment: The Case for Delaying the Retirement Age," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(5), pages 1034-1076, 09.
  16. Nicola Pavoni & Giovanni L. Violante, 2005. "Optimal welfare-to-work programs," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 143, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  17. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-38, April.
  18. Andrew Atkeson & Robert E Lucas, 2010. "On Efficient Distribution with Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2179, David K. Levine.
  19. Nicola Pavoni & Violante, 2007. "Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(1), pages 283-318, 01.
  20. Gruber, Jonathan & Wise, David, 1998. "Social Security and Retirement: An International Comparison," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 158-63, May.
  21. Gruber, Jonathan, 1997. "The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of Unemployment Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 192-205, March.
  22. Blundell, Richard & Ham, John & Meghir, Costas, 1998. "Unemployment, discouraged workers and female labour supply," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 103-131, June.
  23. Cahuc, Pierre & Lehmann, Etienne, 2000. "Should unemployment benefits decrease with the unemployment spell?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 135-153, July.
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Cited by:
  1. J. Ignacio García Pérez & Alfonso R. Sánchez Mártin, 2012. "Fostering job search among older workers: the case for pension reform," Working Papers 12.09, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
  2. Hairault, Jean-Olivier, 2012. "Pour l’emploi des seniors — Assurance chômage et licenciements," Opuscules du CEPREMAP, CEPREMAP, number 28.

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