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Compensation for Regulatory Takings in the Virtual Absence of Constitutional Provision: The Case of Korea

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  • Kim, Chung-Ho
  • Kim, Kyung-Hwan

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  • Kim, Chung-Ho & Kim, Kyung-Hwan, 2002. "Compensation for Regulatory Takings in the Virtual Absence of Constitutional Provision: The Case of Korea," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 108-124, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhouse:v:11:y:2002:i:2:p:108-124
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cordes, Joseph J. & Weisbrod, Burton A., 1979. "Governmental behavior in response to compensation requirements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 47-58, February.
    2. Miceli, Thomas J & Segerson, Kathleen, 1994. "Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 749-776, June.
    3. Richard L. Stroup, 1997. "The Economics Of Compensating Property Owners," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(4), pages 55-65, October.
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