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Enhanced fee-for-service model and physician productivity: Evidence from Family Health Groups in Ontario

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  • Kantarevic, Jasmin
  • Kralj, Boris
  • Weinkauf, Darrel

Abstract

We study an enhanced fee-for-service model for primary care physicians in the Family Health Groups (FHG) in Ontario, Canada. In contrast to the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) model, the FHG model includes targeted fee increases, extended hours, performance-based initiatives, and patient enrolment. Using a long panel of claims data, we find that the FHG model significantly increases physician productivity relative to the FFS model, as measured by the number of services, patient visits, and distinct patients seen. We also find that the FHG physicians have lower referral rates and treat slightly more complex patients than the comparable FFS physicians. These results suggest that the FHG model offers a promising alternative to the FFS model for increasing physician productivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Kantarevic, Jasmin & Kralj, Boris & Weinkauf, Darrel, 2011. "Enhanced fee-for-service model and physician productivity: Evidence from Family Health Groups in Ontario," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 99-111, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:30:y:2011:i:1:p:99-111
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthieu Cassou & Julien Mousquès & Carine Franc, 2020. "General practitioners’ income and activity: the impact of multi-professional group practice in France," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 21(9), pages 1295-1315, December.
    2. Rudoler, David & Laporte, Audrey & Barnsley, Janet & Glazier, Richard H. & Deber, Raisa B., 2015. "Paying for primary care: A cross-sectional analysis of cost and morbidity distributions across primary care payment models in Ontario Canada," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 18-28.
    3. David Gray & William Hogg & Michael E. Green & Yan Zhang, 2015. "Did Family Physicians Who Opted into a New Payment Model Receive an Offer They Should Not Refuse? Experimental Evidence from Ontario," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 41(2), pages 151-165, June.
    4. Jasmin Kantarevic & Boris Kralj, 2016. "Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Theory and Its Application in Ontario," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(10), pages 1326-1340, October.
    5. Strumpf, Erin & Ammi, Mehdi & Diop, Mamadou & Fiset-Laniel, Julie & Tousignant, Pierre, 2017. "The impact of team-based primary care on health care services utilization and costs: Quebec’s family medicine groups," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 76-94.
    6. Somé, N.H. & Devlin, R.A. & Mehta, N. & Zaric, G.S. & Sarma, S., 2020. "Team-based primary care practice and physician's services: Evidence from Family Health Teams in Ontario, Canada," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 264(C).
    7. Jeannette Brosig‐Koch & Heike Hennig‐Schmidt & Nadja Kairies‐Schwarz & Daniel Wiesen, 2017. "The Effects of Introducing Mixed Payment Systems for Physicians: Experimental Evidence," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(2), pages 243-262, February.
    8. Nadine Chami & Arthur Sweetman, 2019. "Payment models in primary health care: A driver of the quantity and quality of medical laboratory utilization," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(10), pages 1166-1178, October.
    9. David Rudoler & Raisa Deber & Janet Barnsley & Richard H. Glazier & Adrian Rohit Dass & Audrey Laporte, 2015. "Paying for Primary Care: The Factors Associated with Physician Self‐selection into Payment Models," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(9), pages 1229-1242, September.
    10. Vu, Thyna & Anderson, Kelly K. & Devlin, Rose Anne & Somé, Nibene H. & Sarma, Sisira, 2021. "Physician remuneration schemes, psychiatric hospitalizations and follow-up care: Evidence from blended fee-for-service and capitation models," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 268(C).
    11. Nibene H. Somé & Rose Anne Devlin & Nirav Mehta & Greg Zaric & Lihua Li & Salimah Shariff & Bachir Belhadji & Amardeep Thind & Amit Garg & Sisira Sarma, 2019. "Production of physician services under fee‐for‐service and blended fee‐for‐service: Evidence from Ontario, Canada," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(12), pages 1418-1434, December.
    12. Zhang, Xue & Sweetman, Arthur, 2018. "Blended capitation and incentives: Fee codes inside and outside the capitated basket," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 16-29.
    13. Jasmin Kantarevic & Boris Kralj, 2013. "Link Between Pay For Performance Incentives And Physician Payment Mechanisms: Evidence From The Diabetes Management Incentive In Ontario," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(12), pages 1417-1439, December.
    14. Boris Kralj & Jasmin Kantarevic, 2013. "Quality and quantity in primary care mixed-payment models: evidence from family health organizations in Ontario," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 46(1), pages 208-238, February.
    15. Bradley Rossen & Akhter Faroque, 2016. "Diagnosing the Causes of Rising Health-Care Expenditure in Canada: Does Baumol's Cost Disease Loom Large?," American Journal of Health Economics, MIT Press, vol. 2(2), pages 184-212, Spring.
    16. Coyle, Natalie & Strumpf, Erin & Fiset-Laniel, Julie & Tousignant, Pierre & Roy, Yves, 2014. "Characteristics of physicians and patients who join team-based primary care practices: Evidence from Quebec's Family Medicine Groups," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 264-272.
    17. Himmel, Konrad & Schneider, Udo, 2017. "Ambulatory care at the end of a billing period," hche Research Papers 14, University of Hamburg, Hamburg Center for Health Economics (hche).
    18. Boris Kralj & Jasmin Kantarevic, 2013. "Quality and quantity in primary care mixed‐payment models: evidence from family health organizations in Ontario," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 46(1), pages 208-238, February.
    19. repec:zbw:rwirep:0543 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Jeannette Brosig-Koch & Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Nadja Kairies-Schwarz & Daniel Wiesen, 2015. "The Effects of Introducing Mixed Payment Systems for Physicians – Experimental Evidence," Ruhr Economic Papers 0543, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    21. Jason M. Sutherland & Erik Hellsten, 2017. "Breaking the Silos: Funding for the Healthcare We Need," C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, C.D. Howe Institute, issue 463, January.

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