Does the presence of arbitrageurs decrease equilibrium asset price volatility? I study an economy with arbitrageurs, informed investors, and noise traders. Arbitrageurs face a trade-off between "inference" and "arbitrage": they would like to buy assets in response to temporary price declines--the arbitrage effect--but sell when prices decline permanently--the inference effect. In equilibrium, the presence of arbitrageurs increases volatility when the inference effect dominates the arbitrage effect. From a technical point of view, the paper offers closed form solutions to a dynamic equilibrium model with asymmetric information and non-Gaussian priors.
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Volume (Year): 18 (2009) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 49-64 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997.
" The Limits of Arbitrage,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 35-55, March.
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De Long, J Bradford & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, 1990.
"Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 703-38, August.
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