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Dynamical Systems with a Continuum of Randomly Matched Agents

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Alos-Ferrer, Carlos

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 86 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 245-267
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:86:y:1999:i:2:p:245-267

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Akihiko Matsui & Kiminori Matsuyama, 1990. "An Approach to Equilibrium Selection," Discussion Papers 970, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215.
  3. Judd, Kenneth L., 1985. "The law of large numbers with a continuum of IID random variables," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 19-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Boylan, Richard T., 1990. "Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals," Working Papers 748, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  5. Peters, Michael, 1991. "Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1425-54, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. McLennan, Andrew & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1991. "Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1395-1424, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Michael Peters, 1995. "On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts," Working Papers peters-95-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1998. "The Social Selection of Flexible and Rigid Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 63-82, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Boylan, Richard T., 1992. "Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 473-504, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Itzhak Gilboa & Akihiko Matsui, 1990. "A Model of Random Matching," Discussion Papers 887, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Francesco Squintani, 2004. "Backward Induction and Model Deterioration," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1157-1157. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Darrell Duffie & Yeneng Sun, 2004. "The Exact Law of Large Numbers for Independent Random Matching," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000328, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Karavaev, Andrei, 2008. "A Theory of Continuum Economies with Idiosyncratic Shocks and Random Matchings," MPRA Paper 7445, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2000. "Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria," Vienna Economics Papers 0008, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Molzon, Robert & Puzzello, Daniela, 2008. "Random Matching and Aggregate Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 8603, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. Charalambos Aliprantis & Gabriele Camera & Daniela Puzzello, 2006. "Matching and anonymity," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 415-432, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Games with Small Forgetfulness," Discussion Papers 1273, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  8. Sergio Currarini & Paolo Pin & Matthew O. Jackson, 2007. "An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation," Working Papers 2007_20, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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