Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 50 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Other versions of this item:
- Dekel, Eddie, 1989. "Simultaneous Offers and the Inefficiency of Bargaining: A Two-Period Example," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt2b0402g4, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Eddie Dekel., 1989. "Simultaneous Offers and the Inefficiency of Bargaining: A Two-Period Example," Economics Working Papers 89-112, University of California at Berkeley.
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- Duozhe Li, 2004. "Bargaining with History Dependent Preferences," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 516, Econometric Society.
- Gonzalo Olcina Vauteren & Vicente Calabuig Alcantara, 1997. "Forward induction in a wage repeated negotiation," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-16, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Christopher J. Tyson, 2004.
"Iterative Dominance and Sequential Bargaining,"
2004-W23, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Christopher J. Tyson, 2009. "Dominance Solvability of Dynamic Bargaining Games," Working Papers 644, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Vicente Calabuig, 1999. "Ineficiencias de las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados: un panorama," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 23(3), pages 303-329, September.
- Weinberger, Catherine J., 2000. "Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 262-293, May.
- Vicente Calabuig Alcantara, 1997. "Ineficiencias en las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados," Working Papers. Serie EC 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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